Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Possible System Binary Backdoor

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
computer_name, event_action, file_name, process_guid, process_id, target_filename, user
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation or overwrite of commonly targeted Linux system binaries such as cat, ls, cp, ps, mv, netstat, ss, and lsof. Adversaries may replace these utilities with backdoored versions to hide malicious activity, harvest credentials, or maintain persistence while appearing to use legitimate system tools. This technique is associated with rootkit deployment and post-exploitation frameworks such as PANIX.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate system updates or package managers may create or overwrite system binaries during normal operations. Filter for known update processes and package management activity to reduce noise.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 11: File created

Rule body

name: Linux Possible System Binary Backdoor
id: a806d611-ea81-4d8a-9b9b-fbf5b6ec520a
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the creation or overwrite of commonly targeted Linux system binaries such as cat, ls, cp, ps, mv, netstat, ss, and lsof.
    Adversaries may replace these utilities with backdoored versions to hide malicious activity, harvest credentials, or maintain persistence while appearing to use legitimate system tools.
    This technique is associated with rootkit deployment and post-exploitation frameworks such as PANIX.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 11
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where
    
    Filesystem.file_path IN (
        "/usr/bin/cat",
        "/usr/bin/cp",
        "/usr/bin/ls",
        "/usr/bin/lsof",
        "/usr/bin/mv",
        "/usr/bin/netstat",
        "/usr/bin/ps",
        "/usr/bin/ss"
    )
    
    by Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest
       Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_possible_system_binary_backdoor_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain file creation events including the file path and user context. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Filesystem` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate system updates or package managers may create or overwrite system binaries during normal operations. Filter for known update processes and package management activity to reduce noise.
references:
    - https://github.com/Aegrah/PANIX
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Possible System Binary Backdoor activity observed on [$dest$]. System binary [$file_name$] was created or overwritten by [$user$].
threat_objects:
    - field: file_name
      type: file_name
analytic_story:
    - Linux Post-Exploitation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1036
    - T1059.004
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where

Filesystem.file_path IN (
    "/usr/bin/cat",
    "/usr/bin/cp",
    "/usr/bin/ls",
    "/usr/bin/lsof",
    "/usr/bin/mv",
    "/usr/bin/netstat",
    "/usr/bin/ps",
    "/usr/bin/ss"
)

by Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest
   Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `linux_possible_system_binary_backdoor_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Filesystem.file_pathin
  • "/usr/bin/cat"
  • "/usr/bin/cp"
  • "/usr/bin/ls"
  • "/usr/bin/lsof"
  • "/usr/bin/mv"
  • "/usr/bin/netstat"
  • "/usr/bin/ps"
  • "/usr/bin/ss"
field:"TargetFilename" kind:in