Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Root Execution of id

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
CurrentDirectory, IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of the id command by the root user on Linux systems. Attackers commonly run id during post-exploitation to confirm they have achieved root-level privileges after a privilege escalation attempt. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker is verifying superuser access following a successful compromise. If confirmed malicious, this could signal that an attacker has gained full control of the system, enabling them to perform destructive actions, exfiltrate sensitive data, or establish persistent unauthorized access.

Known false positives

  • Administrators and automated scripts routinely run the id command as root for system auditing or configuration tasks. Filter based on known administrative activity or trusted scripts.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Discovery

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 1: Process Create

Rule body

name: Linux Root Execution of id
id: 538dc501-ce3a-4a32-9f56-6dbe0aee1474
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of the `id` command by the root user on Linux systems. Attackers commonly run `id` during post-exploitation to confirm they have achieved root-level privileges after a privilege escalation attempt.
    This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker is verifying superuser access following a successful compromise.
    If confirmed malicious, this could signal that an attacker has gained full control of the system, enabling them to perform destructive actions, exfiltrate sensitive data, or establish persistent unauthorized access.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    Processes.process_path="/usr/bin/id"
    Processes.user="root"
    
    by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id
       Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_root_execution_of_id_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Administrators and automated scripts routinely run the id command as root for system auditing or configuration tasks. Filter based on known administrative activity or trusted scripts.
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Execution of [$process_path$] by [$user$] on [$dest$]
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: Execution of [$process_path$] by [$user$] on [$dest$]
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Linux Post-Exploitation
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1033
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process_path="/usr/bin/id"
Processes.user="root"

by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id
   Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `linux_root_execution_of_id_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.