Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Suspicious Child Process of PostgreSQL

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
CurrentDirectory, IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects PostgreSQL spawning a shell, interpreter, or network utility as a child process. When an attacker exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in PostgreSQL (such as via malicious COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM, CVE-2019-9193, or an insecurely configured extension), the database process itself becomes the parent of attacker-controlled commands. Legitimate PostgreSQL processes do not normally fork shells or download tools, making this a high-fidelity signal for post-exploitation activity.

Known false positives

  • Custom PostgreSQL extensions or wrapper scripts that legitimately invoke shell utilities may trigger this detection. Baseline the environment and use the filter macro to suppress known-good parent/child combinations. Recommend throttling by dest and process_name before enabling broadly.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 1: Process Create

Rule body

name: Linux Suspicious Child Process of PostgreSQL
id: 6488b83f-8e76-43c3-91ee-c90a6d9e8d62
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-17'
modification_date: '2026-07-17'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects PostgreSQL spawning a shell, interpreter, or network utility as a child process.
    When an attacker exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in PostgreSQL (such as via malicious COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM, CVE-2019-9193, or an insecurely configured extension), the database process itself becomes the parent of attacker-controlled commands.
    Legitimate PostgreSQL processes do not normally fork shells or download tools, making this a high-fidelity signal for post-exploitation activity.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    (
        Processes.parent_process_name IN (
            "postgres",
            "postmaster",
            "pg_ctl"
        )
        OR
        Processes.parent_process_path = "*/bin/postgres"
        OR
        Processes.process_current_directory="*/var/lib/postgresql/*/main*"
    )
    Processes.process_name IN (
        "awk", "bash", "curl", "dash", "env", "gawk", "id", "ifconfig",
        "ksh", "lua", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nmap", "openssl", "perl",
        "php", "python", "python2", "python3", "ruby", "sh", "socat",
        "tcpdump", "wget", "whoami", "zsh"
    )
    
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_suspicious_child_process_of_postgresql_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Custom PostgreSQL extensions or wrapper scripts that legitimately invoke shell utilities may trigger this detection. Baseline the environment and use the filter macro to suppress known-good parent/child combinations. Recommend throttling by dest and process_name before enabling broadly.
references:
    - https://www.horizon3.ai/cve-2023-27524-insecure-default-configuration-in-apache-superset-leads-to-remote-code-execution/
    - https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/sql-copy.html
    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9193
finding:
    title: Suspicious Child Process of [$parent_process_path$] identified on [$dest$] via [$process_name$] with the Command Line [$process$]
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Linux Post-Exploitation
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Compromised Linux Host
    - SQL Injection
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1190
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

(
    Processes.parent_process_name IN (
        "postgres",
        "postmaster",
        "pg_ctl"
    )
    OR
    Processes.parent_process_path = "*/bin/postgres"
    OR
    Processes.process_current_directory="*/var/lib/postgresql/*/main*"
)
Processes.process_name IN (
    "awk", "bash", "curl", "dash", "env", "gawk", "id", "ifconfig",
    "ksh", "lua", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nmap", "openssl", "perl",
    "php", "python", "python2", "python3", "ruby", "sh", "socat",
    "tcpdump", "wget", "whoami", "zsh"
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `linux_suspicious_child_process_of_postgresql_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.parent_process_namein
  • "pg_ctl"
  • "postgres"
  • "postmaster"
field:"parent_process_name" kind:in
Processes.parent_process_patheq
  • "*/bin/postgres"
field:"ParentImage" kind:eq
Processes.process_current_directoryeq
  • "*/var/lib/postgresql/*/main*"
field:"CurrentDirectory" kind:eq
Processes.process_namein
  • "awk"
  • "bash"
  • "curl"
  • "dash"
  • "env"
  • "gawk"
  • "id"
  • "ifconfig"
  • "ksh"
  • "lua"
  • "nc"
  • "ncat"
  • "netcat"
  • "nmap"
  • "openssl"
  • "perl"
  • "php"
  • "python"
  • "python2"
  • "python3"
  • "ruby"
  • "sh"
  • "socat"
  • "tcpdump"
  • "wget"
  • "whoami"
  • "zsh"
field:"process_name" kind:in