Detection rules › Splunk

Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
CurrentDirectory, IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Raven Tait, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of a Docker container with the privileged flag set, or with the pid namespace set to the host. This can indicate a container running with elevated permissions and access to the underlying system. Actors can hide containers such as this to enable persistent access.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate system administrators may intentionally run privileged containers for maintenance, debugging, or specific infrastructure tasks. Filter based on known approved workflows and trusted administrative users.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

PlatformRecord / event type
LinuxEvent ID 1: Process Create

Rule body

name: Linux Suspicious Privileged Container Execution
id: 29b888db-d6e7-4286-bbf5-39d9f260444c
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of a Docker container with the privileged flag set, or with the pid namespace set to the host.
    This can indicate a container running with elevated permissions and access to the underlying system. Actors can hide containers such as this to enable persistent access.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    
    Processes.process="*docker *"
    Processes.process="* run*"
    Processes.process IN ("*--privileged*", "*--pid=host*")
    
    by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id
       Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory
       Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user
       Processes.process_name
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_suspicious_privileged_container_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate system administrators may intentionally run privileged containers for maintenance, debugging, or specific infrastructure tasks. Filter based on known approved workflows and trusted administrative users.
references:
    - https://github.com/Aegrah/PANIX
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Suspicious Privileged Container identified on [$dest$] via [$process_name$] with the Command Line [$process$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Linux Post-Exploitation
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1610
    - T1059.004
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process="*docker *"
Processes.process="* run*"
Processes.process IN ("*--privileged*", "*--pid=host*")

by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id
   Processes.process_hash Processes.parent_process_name
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory
   Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user
   Processes.process_name

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `linux_suspicious_privileged_container_execution_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.processeq
  • "* run*"
  • "*docker *"
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*--pid=host*"
  • "*--privileged*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:in