Linux Suspicious Redis Activity

name: Linux Suspicious Redis Activity
id: 098bbfa8-a591-44ab-9ec0-ae8ee82b4450
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects Redis processes spawning a system shell command. This can indicate exploitation activity of a redis server to gain code execution.
data_source:
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    (
        Processes.parent_process_name IN (
            "redis-sentinel",
            "redis-server"
        )
        OR
        Processes.parent_process_path = "*/bin/redis*"
    )
    
    Processes.process_name IN (
        "awk", "bash", "curl", "dash", "gawk", "id", "ifconfig",
        "lua", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "openssl", "perl", "php",
        "python", "python2", "python3", "ruby", "sh", "socat",
        "wget", "whoami", "zsh"
    )
    
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_suspicious_redis_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate administrative scripts or automated maintenance tasks may trigger this detection when managing Redis configurations or performing system operations. Filter based on known administrative activity and approved management tools.
references:
    - https://thesecmaster.com/how-to-fix-cve-2022-0543-a-critical-lua-sandbox-escape-vulnerability-in-redis/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-p2pinfect-worm-malware-targets-linux-and-windows-redis-servers/
finding:
    title: Suspicious Redis Activity identified on [$dest$] via [$process_name$] with the Command Line [$process$]
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Linux Post-Exploitation
    - Compromised Linux Host
    - Linux Persistence Techniques
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - Linux Living Off The Land
    - Command And Control
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2022-0543
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1505
    - T1210
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint