Detection rules › Splunk
Linux Usermod Root UID Set
The following analytic detects the use of usermod to set a user's UID to 0. This functionally sets the user as a root user with full permissions. This approach can be used to bypass regular privilege escalation mechanisms, giving the attacker full control over the system while appearing as a regular user in most monitoring tools.
Known false positives
- Setting a user's UID to 0 is extremely rare in legitimate administration — there is almost no valid operational reason to create a second root-equivalent account this way. False positives are expected to be very low. Verify any alert against change management records before dismissing.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Linux | Event ID 1: Process Create |
Rule body
name: Linux Usermod Root UID Set
id: fe143ad6-ef29-4571-be14-0cd08a32ff34
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-08'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of usermod to set a user's UID to 0. This functionally sets the user as a root user with full permissions. This approach can be used to bypass regular privilege escalation mechanisms, giving the attacker full control over the system while appearing as a regular user in most monitoring tools.
data_source:
- Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name="usermod"
AND (Processes.process IN ("* -u 0 *", "* -u 0") OR Processes.process="*--uid 0*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_usermod_root_uid_set_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Setting a user's UID to 0 is extremely rare in legitimate administration — there is almost no valid operational reason to create a second root-equivalent account this way. False positives are expected to be very low. Verify any alert against change management records before dismissing.
references:
- https://github.com/Aegrah/PANIX
finding:
title: Linux Usermod Root UID Set identified on $dest$ by $user$ via $process_name$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: Potential Usermod Root UID Set by $user$ on $dest$ via $process_name$.
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Linux Privilege Escalation
- Linux Post-Exploitation
- Linux Persistence Techniques
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098
- T1078
- T1548.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name="usermod"
AND (Processes.process IN ("* -u 0 *", "* -u 0") OR Processes.process="*--uid 0*")
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `linux_usermod_root_uid_set_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.process | eq |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:eq |
Processes.process | in |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:in |
Processes.process_name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq |