Detection rules › Splunk
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Registry Value Modified (Sysmon)
The HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy key is responsible for controlling how local accounts are filtered when they are used to access a Windows system remotely. By setting the key to value '1', it effectively disables Remote UAC filtering for local accounts, allowing local admin accounts to use elevated tokens (with full admin rights when connecting remotely). This may leave a system vulnerable to Pass the Hash attacks. This use case detects registry modification events or process executions with registry modification commands targeting LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Defense Impairment | |
| Lateral Movement |
References
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
id: '40510.73996'
title: LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Registry Value Modified
description: The HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy
key is responsible for controlling how local accounts are filtered when they are
used to access a Windows system remotely. By setting the key to value '1', it effectively
disables Remote UAC filtering for local accounts, allowing local admin accounts
to use elevated tokens (with full admin rights when connecting remotely). This may
leave a system vulnerable to Pass the Hash attacks. This use case detects registry
modification events or process executions with registry modification commands targeting
LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (((TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
"Set-ItemProperty" OR "sp " OR "ADD") OR (TERM(EventCode=12) OR "<EventID>12<")
OR TERM(EventCode=13) OR "<EventID>13<") "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System"
"LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" | table _time, host, user user, process, process_*,
parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:modify registry
- defense-evasion:use alternate authentication material:pass the hash
technique_id:
- T1112
- T1550.002
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/china-southeast-asia-espionage
- https://posts.specterops.io/pass-the-hash-is-dead-long-live-localaccounttokenfilterpolicy-506c25a7c167
- https://kb.cybertecsecurity.com/knowledge/localaccounttokenfilterpolicy
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (((TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "Set-ItemProperty" OR "sp " OR "ADD") OR (TERM(EventCode=12) OR "<EventID>12<") OR TERM(EventCode=13) OR "<EventID>13<") "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System" "LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy"
Stage 2: table
| table _time, host, user user, process, process_*, parent_*
Stage 3: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 4: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>1<" |
| 1 | "Set-ItemProperty" |
| 1 | "sp " |
| 1 | "ADD" |
| 1 | "<EventID>12<" |
| 1 | "<EventID>13<" |
| 1 | "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System" |
| 1 | "LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" |