Detection rules › Splunk
Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service
The following analytic identifies the execution of malicious PowerShell commands or payloads via the Windows SC.exe utility. It detects this activity by analyzing Windows System logs (EventCode 7045) and filtering for specific PowerShell-related patterns in the ImagePath field. This behavior is significant because it indicates potential abuse of the Windows Service Control Manager to run unauthorized or harmful scripts, which could lead to system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
Known false positives
- Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Service-Control-Manager | Event ID 7045: A service was installed in the system. |
Rule body
name: Malicious Powershell Executed As A Service
id: 8e204dfd-cae0-4ea8-a61d-e972a1ff2ff8
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-04-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Ryan Becwar
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of malicious PowerShell commands or payloads via the Windows SC.exe utility. It detects this activity by analyzing Windows System logs (EventCode 7045) and filtering for specific PowerShell-related patterns in the ImagePath field. This behavior is significant because it indicates potential abuse of the Windows Service Control Manager to run unauthorized or harmful scripts, which could lead to system compromise. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log System 7045
search: |-
`wineventlog_system`
EventCode=7045
| eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath)
| regex l_ImagePath="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]"
| regex l_ImagePath="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType
ServiceType AccountName UserID dest
| rename UserID as user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows System logs with the Service name, Service File Name Service Start type, and Service Type from your endpoints.
known_false_positives: Creating a hidden powershell service is rare and could key off of those instances.
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf
- http://az4n6.blogspot.com/2017/
- https://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/3/12/powershell-execution-argument-obfuscation-how-it-can-make-detection-easier
finding:
title: Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $ImagePath$ by $user$ on $dest$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: Identifies the abuse the Windows SC.exe to execute malicious powerShell as a service $ImagePath$ by $user$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
- Compromised Windows Host
- Rhysida Ransomware
- Malicious PowerShell
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1569.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_system`
EventCode=7045
Stage 2: eval
| eval l_ImagePath=lower(ImagePath)
Stage 3: regex
| regex l_ImagePath="powershell[.\s]|powershell_ise[.\s]|pwsh[.\s]|psexec[.\s]"
Stage 4: regex
| regex l_ImagePath="-nop[rofile\s]+|-w[indowstyle]*\s+hid[den]*|-noe[xit\s]+|-enc[odedcommand\s]+"
Stage 5: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by EventCode ImagePath ServiceName StartType
ServiceType AccountName UserID dest
Stage 6: rename
| rename UserID as user
Stage 7: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 8: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 9: search
| `malicious_powershell_executed_as_a_service_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7045" |
l_ImagePath | regex_match |
| field:"l_ImagePath" kind:regex_match |