Detection rules › Splunk

Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects PowerShell processes initiated with parameters that bypass the local execution policy for scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing specific flags like "-ex" or "bypass." This activity is significant because bypassing execution policies is a common tactic used by attackers to run malicious scripts undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or persistent access within the environment.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
id: 9be56c82-b1cc-4318-87eb-d138afaaca39
version: 20
creation_date: '2020-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Rico Valdez, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects PowerShell processes initiated with parameters that bypass the local execution policy for scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing specific flags like "-ex" or "bypass." This activity is significant because bypassing execution policies is a common tactic used by attackers to run malicious scripts undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to further system compromise, data exfiltration, or persistent access within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE `process_powershell` (Processes.process="* -ex*"
        AND
        Processes.process="* bypass *")
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: There may be legitimate reasons to bypass the PowerShell execution policy. The PowerShell script being run with this parameter should be validated to ensure that it is legitimate.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: PowerShell local execution policy bypass attempt on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - DHS Report TA18-074A
    - Volt Typhoon
    - China-Nexus Threat Activity
    - AsyncRAT
    - HAFNIUM Group
    - Salt Typhoon
    - XWorm
    - DarkCrystal RAT
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
    - MuddyWater
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/encoded_powershell/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE `process_powershell` (Processes.process="* -ex*"
    AND
    Processes.process="* bypass *")
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "PowerShell.EXE" corpus 120 (sigma 84, splunk 30, elastic 6)
  • "powershell_ise.EXE" corpus 51 (splunk 30, sigma 18, elastic 3)
  • "pwsh.dll" corpus 112 (sigma 79, splunk 30, elastic 3)
Processes.processeq
  • "* -ex*"
  • "* bypass *" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 104 (elastic 60, splunk 44)
  • "powershell_ise.exe" corpus 50 (splunk 29, elastic 21)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 62 (elastic 33, splunk 29)