Detection rules › Splunk
MCP Filesystem Server Suspicious Extension Write
This detection identifies attempts to create executable or script files through MCP filesystem server connections. Threat actors leveraging LLM-based tools may attempt to write malicious executables, scripts, or batch files to disk for persistence or code execution. The detection prioritizes files written to system directories or startup locations which indicate higher likelihood of malicious intent.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
Rule body splunk
name: MCP Filesystem Server Suspicious Extension Write
id: fc2a024a-18c1-4d31-9480-7f04cf3ff293
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-02-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Rod Soto
status: production
type: Hunting
description: This detection identifies attempts to create executable or script files through MCP filesystem server connections. Threat actors leveraging LLM-based tools may attempt to write malicious executables, scripts, or batch files to disk for persistence or code execution. The detection prioritizes files written to system directories or startup locations which indicate higher likelihood of malicious intent.
data_source:
- MCP Server
search: |
`mcp_server` method IN ("write_file", "create_file") direction=inbound
| spath output=file_path path=params.path
| spath output=file_content path=params.content
| eval dest=host
| eval file_extension=lower(mvindex(split(file_path, "."), -1))
| where file_extension IN (
"exe", "dll", "ps1", "bat", "cmd", "vbs", "js", "scr", "msi", "hta", "wsf", "wsh", "pif", "com", "cpl",
"sh", "bash", "zsh", "ksh", "csh", "tcsh", "fish",
"py", "pl", "rb", "php", "lua", "awk",
"so", "dylib", "bin", "elf", "run", "AppImage",
"deb", "rpm", "pkg", "dmg",
"plist", "service", "timer", "socket", "conf"
)
| eval
file_path_lower=lower(file_path),
is_system_path = if(match(file_path_lower, "(windows|system32|syswow64|program files|/usr|/bin|/sbin|/lib|/lib64|/etc|/opt)"), 1, 0),
is_startup_path = if(match(file_path_lower, "(startup|autorun|cron\.d|crontab|launchd|launchagents|launchdaemons|systemd|init\.d|rc\.d|rc\.local|profile\.d|bashrc|zshrc|bash_profile)"), 1, 0),
is_hidden_unix = if(match(file_path, "/\.[^/]+$"), 1, 0),
content_length=len(file_content)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(file_path) as file_paths values(file_extension) as extensions max(is_system_path) as targets_system_path max(is_startup_path) as targets_startup_path max(is_hidden_unix) as targets_hidden_file avg(content_length) as avg_content_size by dest, method
| eval
targets_system_path=if(isnull(targets_system_path), 0, targets_system_path),
targets_startup_path=if(isnull(targets_startup_path), 0, targets_startup_path),
targets_hidden_file=if(isnull(targets_hidden_file), 0, targets_hidden_file)
| sort - targets_startup_path, - targets_system_path, - targets_hidden_file, - count
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| table dest firstTime lastTime count method extensions file_paths targets_system_path targets_startup_path targets_hidden_file avg_content_size
| `mcp_filesystem_server_suspicious_extension_write_filter`
how_to_implement: Install the MCP Technology Add-on from Splunkbase and ensure MCP filesystem server logging is enabled with proper field extraction for params.path and params.content. Schedule the search to run every 5-15 minutes and tune alerting based on whether system or startup paths are targeted.
known_false_positives: Legitimate developers using LLM assistants to generate scripts or automation tools, DevOps engineers creating deployment scripts, and system administrators generating batch files for maintenance tasks.
references:
- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/8377
- https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/securing-ai-agents-model-context-protocol.html
analytic_story:
- Suspicious MCP Activities
asset_type: Web Application
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: application
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/mcp/mcp.log
sourcetype: mcp:jsonrpc
source: mcp.log
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`mcp_server` method IN ("write_file", "create_file") direction=inbound
Stage 2: spath
| spath output=file_path path=params.path
Stage 3: spath
| spath output=file_content path=params.content
Stage 4: eval
| eval dest=host
Stage 5: eval
| eval file_extension=lower(mvindex(split(file_path, "."), -1))
Stage 6: where
| where file_extension IN (
"exe", "dll", "ps1", "bat", "cmd", "vbs", "js", "scr", "msi", "hta", "wsf", "wsh", "pif", "com", "cpl",
"sh", "bash", "zsh", "ksh", "csh", "tcsh", "fish",
"py", "pl", "rb", "php", "lua", "awk",
"so", "dylib", "bin", "elf", "run", "AppImage",
"deb", "rpm", "pkg", "dmg",
"plist", "service", "timer", "socket", "conf"
)
Stage 7: eval
| eval
file_path_lower=lower(file_path),
is_system_path = if(match(file_path_lower, "(windows|system32|syswow64|program files|/usr|/bin|/sbin|/lib|/lib64|/etc|/opt)"), 1, 0),
is_startup_path = if(match(file_path_lower, "(startup|autorun|cron\.d|crontab|launchd|launchagents|launchdaemons|systemd|init\.d|rc\.d|rc\.local|profile\.d|bashrc|zshrc|bash_profile)"), 1, 0),
is_hidden_unix = if(match(file_path, "/\.[^/]+$"), 1, 0),
content_length=len(file_content)
is_hidden_unix =match(file_path, "/\.[^/]+$")10is_startup_path =match(file_path_lower, "(startup|autorun|cron\.d|crontab|launchd|launchagents|launchdaemons|systemd|init\.d|rc\.d|rc\.local|profile\.d|bashrc|zshrc|bash_profile)")10is_system_path =match(file_path_lower, "(windows|system32|syswow64|program files|/usr|/bin|/sbin|/lib|/lib64|/etc|/opt)")10Stage 8: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(file_path) as file_paths values(file_extension) as extensions max(is_system_path) as targets_system_path max(is_startup_path) as targets_startup_path max(is_hidden_unix) as targets_hidden_file avg(content_length) as avg_content_size by dest, method
Stage 9: eval
| eval
targets_system_path=if(isnull(targets_system_path), 0, targets_system_path),
targets_startup_path=if(isnull(targets_startup_path), 0, targets_startup_path),
targets_hidden_file=if(isnull(targets_hidden_file), 0, targets_hidden_file)
targets_hidden_file =isnull(targets_hidden_file)0targets_hidden_filetargets_startup_path =isnull(targets_startup_path)0targets_startup_pathtargets_system_path =isnull(targets_system_path)0targets_system_pathStage 10: sort
| sort - targets_startup_path, - targets_system_path, - targets_hidden_file, - count
Stage 11: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 12: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 13: table
| table dest firstTime lastTime count method extensions file_paths targets_system_path targets_startup_path targets_hidden_file avg_content_size
Stage 14: search
| `mcp_filesystem_server_suspicious_extension_write_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
direction | eq |
|
file_extension | in |
|
method | in |
|
sourcetype | eq |
|