Detection rules › Splunk

Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies mmc.exe spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where mmc.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse the DCOM protocol and MMC20 COM object to execute malicious code, using Windows native binaries documented by the LOLBAS project. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate lateral movement, allowing attackers to execute code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Mmc LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn
id: f6601940-4c74-11ec-b9b7-3e22fbd008af
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-11-23'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies `mmc.exe` spawning a LOLBAS execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `mmc.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries can abuse the DCOM protocol and MMC20 COM object to execute malicious code, using Windows native binaries documented by the LOLBAS project. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate lateral movement, allowing attackers to execute code remotely, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe",
    "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe",
    "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe",
    "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
    "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe",
    "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe",
    "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe",
    "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
    "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe",
    "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe",
    "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
    
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
    Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
    Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
    Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
    Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dcom-lateral-movement-techniques
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/
finding:
    title: Mmc.exe spawned a LOLBAS process on $dest$.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Lateral Movement
    - Living Off The Land
    - Water Gamayun
    - XML Runner Loader
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1021.003
    - T1218.014
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where (Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe",
"Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe",
"Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe",
"Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe",
"Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe",
"SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe",
"Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe",
"Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe",
"Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe",
"Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe",
"Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `mmc_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.parent_process_nameeq
  • "mmc.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 7, splunk 1, kusto 1)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:eq
Processes.process_namein
  • "At.exe" corpus 4 (elastic 3, splunk 1)
  • "Atbroker.exe" corpus 6 (elastic 6)
  • "Bash.exe"
  • "Bitsadmin.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 21, splunk 2)
  • "Certoc.exe" corpus 3 (elastic 3)
  • "Cmstp.exe" corpus 25 (elastic 25)
  • "Diskshadow.exe" corpus 5 (elastic 4, splunk 1)
  • "Dllhost.exe" corpus 19 (elastic 17, splunk 2)
  • "Dnscmd.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
  • "Explorer.exe" corpus 21 (elastic 19, splunk 2)
  • "Extexport.exe"
  • "Forfiles.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 6, splunk 1)
  • "Ftp.exe" corpus 5 (elastic 5)
  • "Gpscript.exe"
  • "Hh.exe" corpus 8 (elastic 5, splunk 3)
  • "Ie4uinit.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "Ieexec.exe" corpus 10 (elastic 10)
  • "Infdefaultinstall.exe"
  • "Installutil.exe" corpus 37 (elastic 32, splunk 5)
  • "Mavinject.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 11, splunk 1)
  • "Mmc.exe" corpus 12 (elastic 7, splunk 5)
  • "Msbuild.exe" corpus 39 (elastic 36, splunk 3)
  • "Msconfig.exe"
  • "Msdt.exe" corpus 9 (elastic 7, splunk 2)
  • "Mshta.exe" corpus 84 (elastic 79, splunk 5)
  • "Msiexec.exe" corpus 46 (elastic 41, splunk 5)
  • "Netsh.exe" corpus 21 (elastic 14, splunk 7)
  • "Odbcconf.exe" corpus 14 (elastic 11, splunk 3)
  • "OfflineScannerShell.exe"
  • "Pcalua.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "Pcwrun.exe"
  • "Pnputil.exe"
  • "Presentationhost.exe"
  • "Rasautou.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • "Regasm.exe" corpus 26 (elastic 24, splunk 2)
  • "Register-cimprovider.exe"
  • "Regsvcs.exe" corpus 23 (elastic 21, splunk 2)
  • "Regsvr32.exe" corpus 73 (elastic 68, splunk 5)
  • "Rundll32.exe" corpus 126 (elastic 100, splunk 26)
  • "Runonce.exe"
  • "Runscripthelper.exe"
  • "Schtasks.exe" corpus 30 (elastic 19, splunk 11)
  • "Scriptrunner.exe"
  • "SettingSyncHost.exe"
  • "Stordiag.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe"
  • "Ttdinject.exe"
  • "Tttracer.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 2)
  • "Verclsid.exe" corpus 2 (elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • "Wab.exe"
  • "Wmic.exe" corpus 66 (elastic 39, splunk 27)
  • "WorkFolders.exe"
  • "Wuauclt.exe" corpus 7 (elastic 7)
  • "Xwizard.exe" corpus 16 (elastic 16)
field:"process_name" kind:in