Detection rules › Splunk

Modify Registry Key (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Persistence
Defense Impairment

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '8335.10406'
title: Modify Registry Key
description: 'Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration
  information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or
  as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution. Threat Actor Association:
  APT27/Emissary Panda, APT29/Nobelium, APT30, APT41, APT43, Flax Typhoon, InvisiMole,
  Kimsuky, Lazarus, MuddyWater, RedEyes, REvil, Velvet Cholllima -- Software Association:
  Avos, BabyShark, BadRabbit, BianLian, BlackByte, DarkWatchman, Dharma, Dridex, Karius,
  Koxic, LockBit, Play, QBot/Qakbot, Ransom Cartel, SunBurst, Trojan.Killdisk/HermeticWiper,
  Trigona, Ursnif, VawTrack'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4657) OR
  "<EventID>4657<") Operation_Type="Existing registry value modified" | table _time,
  host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id, Object_*, Operation_*, New_*,
  Old_*| eval note=Object_Name | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host
  | fields - Operation_*, New_*, Old_* `hec_collect`'
techniques:
- defense-evasion:modify registry
technique_id: 
- T1112
data_category:
- File monitoring
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/
- https://www.netwrix.com/how_to_detect_modification_to_startup_items.html
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/5d497aefe58b7e00011f6947/1565096688890/Windows+Registry+Auditing+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Aug+2019.pdf

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4657) OR "<EventID>4657<") Operation_Type="Existing registry value modified"

Stage 2: table

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id, Object_*, Operation_*, New_*, Old_*

Stage 3: eval

| eval note=Object_Name

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Stage 6: fields

| fields - Operation_*, New_*, Old_* `hec_collect`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4657 corpus 17 (splunk 14, kusto 3)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4657"
Operation_Typeeq
  • "Existing registry value modified"
field:"Operation_Type" kind:eq

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4657<"