Detection rules › Splunk

mshta.exe File Download (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

mshta.exe is a Windows utility used for executing HTML applications and can be abused by adversaries to download files. This use case detects executions of mshta.exe with URLs in the command line. LOLBINS/LOLBAS

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '22128.39012'
title: mshta.exe File Download
description: 'mshta.exe is a Windows utility used for executing HTML applications
  and can be abused by adversaries to download files. This use case detects executions
  of mshta.exe with URLs in the command line. LOLBINS/LOLBAS -- Threat Actor Association:
  LockBit'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  "mshta.exe" | regex process="(?i)(http|ftp)s?:\/\/" | table _time, host, user, signature_id,
  process, process_*, parent_process_path, parent_process_name | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- command-and-control:ingress tool transfer
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:mshta
technique_id:
- T1105
- T1218.005
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://pentera.io/blog/the-lol-isnt-so-funny-when-it-bites-you-in-the-bas/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/
- https://www.falconguard.cz/post/top-10-lol-binaries-and-techniques-used-by-cyber-threat-actors

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "mshta.exe"

Stage 2: regex

| regex process="(?i)(http|ftp)s?:\/\/"

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user, signature_id, process, process_*, parent_process_path, parent_process_name

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
processregex_match
  • "(?i)(http|ftp)s?:\/\/" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1"mshta.exe"