Detection rules › Splunk
Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading
The following analytic detects the suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non-default Windows Defender folders. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify instances where these files are created outside their expected directories. This activity is significant because it is associated with the REvil ransomware, which uses DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to ransomware deployment, resulting in data encryption, system compromise, and potential data loss or extortion.
Known false positives
- quite minimal false positive expected.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11: FileCreate |
Rule body
name: Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading
id: 8bb3f280-dd9b-11eb-84d5-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-07-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Sanjay Govind
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non-default Windows Defender folders. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to identify instances where these files are created outside their expected directories. This activity is significant because it is associated with the REvil ransomware, which uses DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to ransomware deployment, resulting in data encryption, system compromise, and potential data loss or extortion.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 11
search: '|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = "msmpeng.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name = "mpsvc.dll") AND NOT (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*","*\\WinSxS\\*defender-service*","*\\WinSxS\\Temp\\*defender-service*")) by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
known_false_positives: quite minimal false positive expected.
references:
- https://community.sophos.com/b/security-blog/posts/active-ransomware-attack-on-kaseya-customers
finding:
title: Suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder on host - $dest$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Ransomware
- Revil Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1574.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = "msmpeng.exe" OR Filesystem.file_name = "mpsvc.dll") AND NOT (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*","*\\WinSxS\\*defender-service*","*\\WinSxS\\Temp\\*defender-service*")) by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Filesystem.file_path | in | "*\\Program Files\\windows defender\\*", "*\\WinSxS\\*defender-service*", "*\\WinSxS\\Temp\\*defender-service*" | excludes:Filesystem.file_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Filesystem.file_name | eq |
| field:"file_name" kind:eq |