Detection rules › Splunk
Multiple Failed Network Logon Attempts from Host (Windows Event Log)
This use case detects a single source host with failed network (remote) authentication attempts from multiple user accounts in a short time period (default 2 minutes). This can be an indication of a password spraying attack from a compromised host.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4625: An account failed to log on. |
Rule body
id: '35722.62685'
title: Multiple Failed Network Logon Attempts from Host
description: This use case detects a single source host with failed network (remote)
authentication attempts from multiple user accounts in a short time period (default
2 minutes). This can be an indication of a password spraying attack from a compromised
host.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4625) OR
"<EventID>4625<") Logon_Type=3 | regex src_ip!="-" | bin span=120s | stats values(*)
as * by _time, host | eventstats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName)
as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip, client_host | eventstats avg(unique_accounts)
as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by src_ip, client_host| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
| search isOutlier=1 | table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_*, unique_accounts,
tried_accounts, comp_avg, comp_std, client_host '
techniques:
- credential-access:brute force
- credential-access:brute force:password spraying
technique_id:
- T1110
- T1110.003
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/main/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4625) OR "<EventID>4625<") Logon_Type=3
Stage 2: regex
| regex src_ip!="-"
Stage 3: bucket
| bin span=120s
Stage 4: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Stage 5: eventstats
| eventstats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as tried_accounts by _time, src_ip, client_host
Stage 6: eventstats
| eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by src_ip, client_host
Stage 7: eval
| eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3)
Stage 8: eval
| eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0)
isOutlier =if
unique_accounts > 10 AND unique_accounts >= upperBound1else
0Stage 9: search
| search isOutlier=1
Stage 10: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_*, unique_accounts, tried_accounts, comp_avg, comp_std, client_host
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
src_ip | regex_match | "-" | excludes:src_ip |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4625" |
Logon_Type | eq |
| field:"LogonType" kind:eq value:"3" |
isOutlier | eq |
| field:"isOutlier" kind:eq value:"1" |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4625<" |