Detection rules › Splunk

Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
ObjectType, access_mask, dest, object_name, process_name, signature_id
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects non-Firefox processes accessing the Firefox profile directory, which contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts by malware, such as RATs or trojans, to harvest user information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to user accounts, and further compromise of the affected system.

Known false positives

  • other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Non Firefox Process Access Firefox Profile Dir
id: e6fc13b0-1609-11ec-b533-acde48001122
version: 20
creation_date: '2021-09-15'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects non-Firefox processes accessing the Firefox profile directory, which contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts by malware, such as RATs or trojans, to harvest user information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to user accounts, and further compromise of the affected system.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4663
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) ObjectName="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure."
known_false_positives: other browser not listed related to firefox may catch by this rule.
references: []
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: a non firefox browser process $ProcessName$ accessing $ObjectName$
analytic_story:
    - StealC Stealer
    - DarkGate Malware
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - NjRAT
    - Phemedrone Stealer
    - Azorult
    - Salt Typhoon
    - Remcos
    - Warzone RAT
    - Quasar RAT
    - 3CX Supply Chain Attack
    - AgentTesla
    - RedLine Stealer
    - SnappyBee
    - Malicious Inno Setup Loader
    - FIN7
    - Snake Keylogger
    - China-Nexus Threat Activity
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - Lokibot
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
    - VIP Keylogger
    - Salat Stealer
    - Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1555.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 NOT (ProcessName IN ("*\\firefox.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*sql*")) ObjectName="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*"

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName AccessMask EventCode dest

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `non_firefox_process_access_firefox_profile_dir_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
ProcessNamein"*\\explorer.exe", "*\\firefox.exe", "*sql*"excludes:ProcessName

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4663 corpus 35 (splunk 30, kusto 5)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4663"
ObjectNameeq
  • "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles*"
field:"ObjectName" kind:eq