Detection rules › Splunk
ntds.dit Command Line (PowerShell)
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. This use case specifically looks for command line argument executions with ntds.dit
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body yaml
id: '20543.36412'
title: ntds.dit Command Line
description: 'Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory
domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other
information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. This
use case specifically looks for command line argument executions with ntds.dit.
-- Threat Actor Association: Mustang Panda (aka. Stately Taurus//Earth Preta/BRONZE
PRESIDENT/TA416/RedDelta), Volt Typhoon - Software Association: Akira -- Atomics
T1003.003 Test #2 Atomics T1003.003 Test #3 Atomics T1003.003 Test #6'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR
"<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") "ntds.dit" | regex
process="(?i)ntds\.dit" | table _time, host, user process, process_name, signature_id,
process_msg | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- credential-access:os credential dumping:ntds
technique_id:
- T1003.003
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") "ntds.dit"
Stage 2: regex
| regex process="(?i)ntds\.dit"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user process, process_name, signature_id, process_msg
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4103<" |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4104<" |
| 1 | "ntds.dit" |