Detection rules › Splunk

ntds.dit Command Line (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. This use case specifically looks for command line argument executions with ntds.dit

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1003.003 OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

References

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation

Rule body yaml

id: '20543.36404'
title: ntds.dit Command Line
description: 'Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory
  domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other
  information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. This
  use case specifically looks for command line argument executions with ntds.dit.
  -- Threat Actor Association: Mustang Panda (aka. Stately Taurus//Earth Preta/BRONZE
  PRESIDENT/TA416/RedDelta), Volt Typhoon - Software Association: Akira -- Atomics
  T1003.003 Test #2 Atomics T1003.003 Test #3 Atomics T1003.003 Test #6'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "EventID>1<")
  "ntds.dit" | regex process="(?i)(ntds\.dit)" | table _time, host, user parent_*,
  process, process_*, signature_id | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time,
  host '
techniques:
- credential-access:os credential dumping:ntds
technique_id:
- T1003.003
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "EventID>1<") "ntds.dit"

Stage 2: regex

| regex process="(?i)(ntds\.dit)"

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 237 (splunk 224, kusto 13)
processregex_match
  • "(?i)(ntds.dit)"

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1TERM
1"EventID>1<"
1"ntds.dit"