Detection rules › Splunk

Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
aws::userAgent, command, description, dest, src, src_user_id, user
Author
Bhavin Patel, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies modifications to Okta Identity Provider (IDP) lifecycle events, including creation, activation, deactivation, and deletion of IDP configurations. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud. Monitoring these events is crucial for maintaining the integrity and security of authentication mechanisms. Unauthorized or anomalous changes could indicate potential security breaches or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate authentication processes, potentially gaining unauthorized access or disrupting identity management systems.

Known false positives

  • It's possible for legitimate administrative actions or automated processes to trigger this detection, especially if there are bulk modifications to Okta IDP lifecycle events. Review the context of the modification, such as the user making the change and the specific lifecycle event modified, to determine if it aligns with expected behavior.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

name: Okta IDP Lifecycle Modifications
id: e0be2c83-5526-4219-a14f-c3db2e763d15
version: 9
creation_date: '2024-04-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies modifications to Okta Identity Provider (IDP) lifecycle events, including creation, activation, deactivation, and deletion of IDP configurations. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud. Monitoring these events is crucial for maintaining the integrity and security of authentication mechanisms. Unauthorized or anomalous changes could indicate potential security breaches or misconfigurations. If confirmed malicious, attackers could manipulate authentication processes, potentially gaining unauthorized access or disrupting identity management systems.
data_source:
    - Okta
search: |-
    `okta` eventType IN ("system.idp.lifecycle.activate","system.idp.lifecycle.create","system.idp.lifecycle.delete","system.idp.lifecycle.deactivate")
      | stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(target{}.id) as target_id values(target{}.type) as target_modified
        BY src dest src_user_id
           user user_agent command
           description
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `okta_idp_lifecycle_modifications_filter`
how_to_implement: The analytic leverages Okta OktaIm2 logs to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6553).
known_false_positives: It's possible for legitimate administrative actions or automated processes to trigger this detection, especially if there are bulk modifications to Okta IDP lifecycle events. Review the context of the modification, such as the user making the change and the specific lifecycle event modified, to determine if it aligns with expected behavior.
references:
    - https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/behind-the-breach-cross-tenant-impersonation-in-okta/
    - https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/6553
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: A user [$user$] is attempting IDP lifecycle modification - [$description$] from IP Address - [$src$]"
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Suspicious Okta Activity
asset_type: Okta Tenant
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1087.004
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: application
security_domain: identity

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`okta` eventType IN ("system.idp.lifecycle.activate","system.idp.lifecycle.create","system.idp.lifecycle.delete","system.idp.lifecycle.deactivate")

Stage 2: stats

| stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(target{}.id) as target_id values(target{}.type) as target_modified
    BY src dest src_user_id
       user user_agent command
       description

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `okta_idp_lifecycle_modifications_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
eventTypein
  • "system.idp.lifecycle.activate"
  • "system.idp.lifecycle.create"
  • "system.idp.lifecycle.deactivate"
  • "system.idp.lifecycle.delete"
field:"eventType" kind:in
sourcetypeeq
  • OktaIM2:log
field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"OktaIM2:log"