Detection rules › Splunk
Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process (Windows Event Log)
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. This use case detects suspicious processes with a parent process in the Users\Public directory.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '30578.54661'
title: Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process
description: Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors
to evade detection. Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute
commands, scripts, or binaries. This use case detects suspicious processes with
a parent process in the Users\Public directory.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "\\Users\\Public" ("powershell" OR "pwsh" OR "wscript.exe"
OR "cscript.exe" OR "bitsadmin" OR "certutil" OR "mshta.exe") OR ("cmd.exe" (" /c
" OR " /r " OR " /k " )) | regex parent_process_path="^C:\x5cUsers\x5cPublic"| table
_time, host, user, parent_process_name, parent_process_path, process_name, process_path,
process | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:command and scripting interpreter
- defense-evasion:hide artifacts
technique_id:
- T1059
- T1564
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_from_public_folder_as_parent/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "\\Users\\Public" ("powershell" OR "pwsh" OR "wscript.exe" OR "cscript.exe" OR "bitsadmin" OR "certutil" OR "mshta.exe") OR ("cmd.exe" (" /c " OR " /r " OR " /k " ))
Stage 2: regex
| regex parent_process_path="^C:\x5cUsers\x5cPublic"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, parent_process_name, parent_process_path, process_name, process_path, process
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
parent_process_path | regex_match |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | "\\Users\\Public" |
| 1 | "powershell" |
| 1 | "pwsh" |
| 1 | "wscript.exe" |
| 1 | "cscript.exe" |
| 1 | "bitsadmin" |
| 1 | "certutil" |
| 1 | "mshta.exe" |
| 1 | "cmd.exe" |
| 1 | " /c " |
| 1 | " /r " |
| 1 | " /k " |