Detection rules › Splunk
PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
The following analytic detects a suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request, identified by Event Code 4768. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs to identify TGT requests with unusual fields, which may indicate the use of tools like Rubeus following the exploitation of CVE-2021-36942 (PetitPotam). This activity is significant as it can signal an attacker leveraging a compromised certificate to request Kerberos tickets, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
Known false positives
- False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication, since PreAuthType 2 can appear on some initial or fallback authentication flows alongside a populated certificate field. Tune further based on observed authentication patterns in the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. |
Rule body
name: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
id: e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-09-01'
modification_date: '2026-07-04'
author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request, identified by Event Code 4768. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs to identify TGT requests with unusual fields, which may indicate the use of tools like Rubeus following the exploitation of CVE-2021-36942 (PetitPotam). This activity is significant as it can signal an attacker leveraging a compromised certificate to request Kerberos tickets, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4768
search: |-
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=4768
src!="::1"
TargetUserName=*$
CertThumbprint!=""
PreAuthType=2
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest TargetUserName PreAuthType CertThumbprint src action
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.
known_false_positives: |-
False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication, since PreAuthType 2 can appear on some initial or fallback authentication flows alongside a populated certificate field.
Tune further based on observed authentication patterns in the environment.
references:
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768#kerberos-preauthentication-types
finding:
title: A Kerberos TGT was requested in a non-standard manner against $dest$, potentially related to CVE-2021-36942, PetitPotam.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- PetitPotam NTLM Relay on Active Directory Certificate Services
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
- CVE-2021-36942
mitre_attack_id:
- T1003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=4768
src!="::1"
TargetUserName=*$
CertThumbprint!=""
PreAuthType=2
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest TargetUserName PreAuthType CertThumbprint src action
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.