Detection rules › Splunk

Potential CVE-2024-21413: Outbound SMB from Outlook (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

A critical vulnerability CVE-2024-21413 in Microsoft Outlook, discovered by Check Point, enables remote code execution from merely opening an email containing malicious links, bypassing Outlook's Protected View. This flaw, exploitable without user interaction, allows attackers to perform high-privilege actions and steal NTLM credentials via crafted Office documents. This use case detects outbound SMB connections from Outlook which may indicate successful CVE-2024-21413 execution.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '28360.51640'
title: 'Potential CVE-2024-21413: Outbound SMB from Outlook'
description: A critical vulnerability CVE-2024-21413 in Microsoft Outlook, discovered
  by Check Point, enables remote code execution from merely opening an email containing
  malicious links, bypassing Outlook's Protected View. This flaw, exploitable without
  user interaction, allows attackers to perform high-privilege actions and steal NTLM
  credentials via crafted Office documents. This use case detects outbound SMB connections
  from Outlook which may indicate successful CVE-2024-21413 execution.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (EventCode=5156 OR "<EventID>5156<")
  (TERM(445) OR TERM(SMB)) "outlook.exe" | where match(dest_port, "^445$") and match(process_name,
  "(?i)outlook\.exe") and not match(dest_ip, "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.|fc00:|fd00:|fe80:)")
  | table _time, host, user, dest_ip, dest_port, process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*)
  as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:user execution:malicious link
technique_id:
- T1204.001
data_category:
- Windows event logs
- Process use of network
references:
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/the-risks-of-the-monikerlink-bug-in-microsoft-outlook-and-the-big-picture/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (EventCode=5156 OR "<EventID>5156<") (TERM(445) OR TERM(SMB)) "outlook.exe"

Stage 2: where

| where match(dest_port, "^445$") and match(process_name, "(?i)outlook\.exe") and not match(dest_ip, "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.|fc00:|fd00:|fe80:)")

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user, dest_ip, dest_port, process_*

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
dest_ipregex_match"^(10.|172.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1]).|192.168.|fc00:|fd00:|fe80:)"excludes:dest_ip

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 5156 corpus 15 (splunk 13, kusto 2)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"5156"
dest_portregex_match
  • "^445$" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"DestinationPort" kind:regex_match
process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)outlook.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>5156<"
1445
1SMB
1"outlook.exe"