Detection rules › Splunk

Potential CVE-2024-21413: Outbound SMB from Outlook (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

A critical vulnerability CVE-2024-21413 in Microsoft Outlook, discovered by Check Point, enables remote code execution from merely opening an email containing malicious links, bypassing Outlook's Protected View. This flaw, exploitable without user interaction, allows attackers to perform high-privilege actions and steal NTLM credentials via crafted Office documents. This use case detects outbound SMB connections from Outlook which may indicate successful CVE-2024-21413 execution.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

id: '28360.51640'
title: 'Potential CVE-2024-21413: Outbound SMB from Outlook'
description: A critical vulnerability CVE-2024-21413 in Microsoft Outlook, discovered
  by Check Point, enables remote code execution from merely opening an email containing
  malicious links, bypassing Outlook's Protected View. This flaw, exploitable without
  user interaction, allows attackers to perform high-privilege actions and steal NTLM
  credentials via crafted Office documents. This use case detects outbound SMB connections
  from Outlook which may indicate successful CVE-2024-21413 execution.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (EventCode=5156 OR "<EventID>5156<")
  (TERM(445) OR TERM(SMB)) "outlook.exe" | where match(dest_port, "^445$") and match(process_name,
  "(?i)outlook\.exe") and not match(dest_ip, "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.|fc00:|fd00:|fe80:)")
  | table _time, host, user, dest_ip, dest_port, process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*)
  as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- execution:user execution:malicious link
technique_id:
- T1204.001
data_category:
- Windows event logs
- Process use of network
references:
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/the-risks-of-the-monikerlink-bug-in-microsoft-outlook-and-the-big-picture/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (EventCode=5156 OR "<EventID>5156<") (TERM(445) OR TERM(SMB)) "outlook.exe"

Stage 2: where

| where match(dest_port, "^445$") and match(process_name, "(?i)outlook\.exe") and not match(dest_ip, "^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.|fc00:|fd00:|fe80:)")

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user, dest_ip, dest_port, process_*

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
dest_ipmatch"^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|192\.168\.|fc00:|fd00:|fe80:)"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 5156 corpus 15 (splunk 13, kusto 2)
dest_portmatch
  • "^445$" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
process_namematch
  • "(?i)outlook\.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>5156<"
1TERM
1445
1TERM
1SMB
1"outlook.exe"