Detection rules › Splunk
Potential Executable Masquerading as Document - Windows (Windows Event Log)
Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. This use case detects executions of files that appear to be document or image files but execute as script or executable files, or executable/script files with 3 or more spaces or underscores preceding the extension in an effort to obscure the file's actual extension. CVE-2023-38831
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '21579.38119'
title: Potential Executable Masquerading as Document - Windows
description: 'Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous
file types of payloads. This use case detects executions of files that appear to
be document or image files but execute as script or executable files, or executable/script
files with 3 or more spaces or underscores preceding the extension in an effort
to obscure the file''s actual extension. CVE-2023-38831 -- Threat Actor Association:
APT28, APT40, Sandworm Team, UAC-0057 (GhostWriter)'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) (".pdf" OR ".jpg" OR ".jpeg" OR "gif" OR ".ico"
OR ".doc" OR ".xls" OR ".docx" OR ".xlsx" OR ".png" OR ".xml" OR ".csv" OR ".ppt"
OR ".pptx" OR ".rtf" OR ".txt") (".cmd" OR ".bat" OR ".ps1" OR ".vbs" OR ".js" OR
".py" OR ".exe" OR ".msi" OR ".vbe" OR ".lnk" OR ".scr") | regex process="(?i)((\s{3,}|_{3,})|(\.(pdf|jpg|jpeg|gif|ico|doc|xls|docx|xlsx|png|xml|csv|ppt|pptx|rtf|txt)(\s+)?))\.(cmd|bat|ps1|vbs|js|py|exe|msi|vbe|lnk|scr)"
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s |
stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:masquerading:double file extension
technique_id:
- T1036.007
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/cve-2023-38831-winrar-zero-day/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) (".pdf" OR ".jpg" OR ".jpeg" OR "gif" OR ".ico" OR ".doc" OR ".xls" OR ".docx" OR ".xlsx" OR ".png" OR ".xml" OR ".csv" OR ".ppt" OR ".pptx" OR ".rtf" OR ".txt") (".cmd" OR ".bat" OR ".ps1" OR ".vbs" OR ".js" OR ".py" OR ".exe" OR ".msi" OR ".vbe" OR ".lnk" OR ".scr")
Stage 2: regex
| regex process="(?i)((\s{3,}|_{3,})|(\.(pdf|jpg|jpeg|gif|ico|doc|xls|docx|xlsx|png|xml|csv|ppt|pptx|rtf|txt)(\s+)?))\.(cmd|bat|ps1|vbs|js|py|exe|msi|vbe|lnk|scr)"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
process | regex_match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | ".pdf" |
| 1 | ".jpg" |
| 1 | ".jpeg" |
| 1 | "gif" |
| 1 | ".ico" |
| 1 | ".doc" |
| 1 | ".xls" |
| 1 | ".docx" |
| 1 | ".xlsx" |
| 1 | ".png" |
| 1 | ".xml" |
| 1 | ".csv" |
| 1 | ".ppt" |
| 1 | ".pptx" |
| 1 | ".rtf" |
| 1 | ".txt" |
| 1 | ".cmd" |
| 1 | ".bat" |
| 1 | ".ps1" |
| 1 | ".vbs" |
| 1 | ".js" |
| 1 | ".py" |
| 1 | ".exe" |
| 1 | ".msi" |
| 1 | ".vbe" |
| 1 | ".lnk" |
| 1 | ".scr" |