Detection rules › Splunk
Potential LSA password filter (PowerShell)
Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. This use case looks for values added to LSA registry with reg.exe
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Defense Impairment | |
| Credential Access |
References
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
id: '8154.34953'
title: Potential LSA password filter
description: 'Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries
(DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated.
Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain
and local accounts. This use case looks for values added to LSA registry with reg.exe
- Software Association: Cactus, Vice Society - Atomics T1556.002 Test #1'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR
"<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") ((TERM(Set-ItemProperty)
OR TERM(sp) OR (TERM(reg) TERM(add)))) ("HKLM" OR "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE") ("lsa" "control")
| table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id, parent_* | bin span=1s
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:modify authentication process:password filter dll
- privilege-escalation:boot or logon autostart execution:authentication package
- persistence:boot or logon autostart execution:authentication package
- persistence:modify authentication process:password filter dll
- credential-access:modify authentication process:password filter dll
technique_id:
- T1556.002
- T1547.002
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
- Process command-line parameters
references:
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07190154/The-ProjectSauron-APT_research_KL.pdf
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") ((TERM(Set-ItemProperty) OR TERM(sp) OR (TERM(reg) TERM(add)))) ("HKLM" OR "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE") ("lsa" "control")
Stage 2: table
| table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id, parent_*
Stage 3: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 4: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4103<" |
| 1 | "<EventID>4104<" |
| 1 | "Set-ItemProperty" |
| 1 | sp |
| 1 | reg |
| 1 | add |
| 1 | "HKLM" |
| 1 | "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE" |
| 1 | "lsa" |
| 1 | "control" |