Detection rules › Splunk
PowerShell Domain Enumeration
The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands used for domain enumeration, such as get-netdomaintrust and get-adgroupmember. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to map out the domain structure and identify key users and groups. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, and unauthorized access to sensitive information within the domain.
Known false positives
- Legitimate use can be common or expected in certain environments. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body
name: PowerShell Domain Enumeration
id: e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122
version: 16
creation_date: '2021-06-15'
modification_date: '2026-06-28'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands used for domain enumeration, such as `get-netdomaintrust` and `get-adgroupmember`.
It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell.
This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to map out the domain structure and identify key users and groups.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, and unauthorized access to sensitive information within the domain.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell`
EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText IN (
*get-netdomaintrust*,
*get-netforesttrust*,
*get-addomain*,
*get-adgroupmember*,
*get-domainuser*
)
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: Legitimate use can be common or expected in certain environments. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] contains domain enumeration commands executed on host $dest$
analytic_story:
- Hermetic Wiper
- Malicious PowerShell
- CISA AA23-347A
- Data Destruction
- Interlock Ransomware
- Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell`
EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText IN (
*get-netdomaintrust*,
*get-netforesttrust*,
*get-addomain*,
*get-adgroupmember*,
*get-domainuser*
)
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104" |
ScriptBlockText | in |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:in |