Detection rules › Splunk

PowerShell Domain Enumeration

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands used for domain enumeration, such as get-netdomaintrust and get-adgroupmember. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to map out the domain structure and identify key users and groups. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, and unauthorized access to sensitive information within the domain.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate use can be common or expected in certain environments. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: PowerShell Domain Enumeration
id: e1866ce2-ca22-11eb-8e44-acde48001122
version: 16
creation_date: '2021-06-15'
modification_date: '2026-06-28'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands used for domain enumeration, such as `get-netdomaintrust` and `get-adgroupmember`.
    It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell.
    This activity is significant as it often indicates reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to map out the domain structure and identify key users and groups.
    If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further targeted attacks, privilege escalation, and unauthorized access to sensitive information within the domain.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell`
    EventCode=4104
    ScriptBlockText IN (
        *get-netdomaintrust*,
        *get-netforesttrust*,
        *get-addomain*,
        *get-adgroupmember*,
        *get-domainuser*
    )
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: Legitimate use can be common or expected in certain environments. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] contains domain enumeration commands executed on host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Malicious PowerShell
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Data Destruction
    - Interlock Ransomware
    - Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell`
EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText IN (
    *get-netdomaintrust*,
    *get-netforesttrust*,
    *get-addomain*,
    *get-adgroupmember*,
    *get-domainuser*
)

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `powershell_domain_enumeration_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTextin
  • *get-addomain*
  • *get-adgroupmember*
  • *get-domainuser* corpus 3 (splunk 3)
  • *get-netdomaintrust*
  • *get-netforesttrust*
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:in