Detection rules › Splunk

PowerShell Environment Variable Execution

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that combine environment variable access ($env: or [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable) with Invoke-Expression or its alias iex to dynamically construct and run code at runtime. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to stage and execute payloads by embedding commands or encoded content inside environment variables, then evaluating them on the fly — effectively hiding the true execution intent from static inspection. Detection is based on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104), which captures the de-obfuscated script block before it executes. Triggering this analytic indicates a potential attempt to execute environment-variable-stored code, a behavior observed in malware loaders and stagers, including those associated with the VIP Keylogger campaign.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: PowerShell Environment Variable Execution
id: 02c1d8e9-044c-401f-906c-cc95445af8bd
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that combine environment variable access (`$env:` or `[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable`) with `Invoke-Expression` or its alias `iex` to dynamically construct and run code at runtime. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to stage and execute payloads by embedding commands or encoded content inside environment variables, then evaluating them on the fly — effectively hiding the true execution intent from static inspection. Detection is based on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104), which captures the de-obfuscated script block before it executes. Triggering this analytic indicates a potential attempt to execute environment-variable-stored code, a behavior observed in malware loaders and stagers, including those associated with the VIP Keylogger campaign.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell`
    EventCode=4104
    ScriptBlockText="*$env:*"
    ScriptBlockText IN (
        "*.Invoke()*",
        "*[scriptblock]::Create*",
        "*iex *",
        "*Invoke-Expression*"
    )
    ScriptBlockText="*[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable*"
    | regex ScriptBlockText="(?i)((invoke-expression|iex\s+|\biex\b).*\$env:|\[scriptblock\]::create\s*\(\s*\$env:[^)]+\)\s*(?:\.\s*invoke\s*\(\s*\))?)"
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    by dest signature signature_id user_id vendor_product EventID Guid Opcode Name Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId ScriptBlockText
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `powershell_environment_variable_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: The following analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$Computer$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  Computer = "$Computer$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$Computer$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$Computer$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script execute environment variable in [$ScriptBlockText$] on host [$dest$]
analytic_story:
    - VIP Keylogger
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/vip_env_var_execution/env_vip_pwh_intl.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell`
EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText="*$env:*"
ScriptBlockText IN (
    "*.Invoke()*",
    "*[scriptblock]::Create*",
    "*iex *",
    "*Invoke-Expression*"
)
ScriptBlockText="*[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable*"

Stage 2: regex

| regex ScriptBlockText="(?i)((invoke-expression|iex\s+|\biex\b).*\$env:|\[scriptblock\]::create\s*\(\s*\$env:[^)]+\)\s*(?:\.\s*invoke\s*\(\s*\))?)"

Stage 3: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 4: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by dest signature signature_id user_id vendor_product EventID Guid Opcode Name Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId ScriptBlockText

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `powershell_environment_variable_execution_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 268 (splunk 268)
ScriptBlockTexteq
  • "*$env:*"
  • "*[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable*"
ScriptBlockTextin
  • "*.Invoke()*"
  • "*Invoke-Expression*"
  • "*[scriptblock]::Create*"
  • "*iex *"
ScriptBlockTextregex_match
  • "(?i)((invoke-expression|iex\s+|\biex\b).*$env:|[scriptblock]::create\s*(\s*$env:[^)]+)\s*(?:.\s*invoke\s*(\s*))?)"