Detection rules › Splunk
Powershell Execute COM Object
The following analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific script block text indicating the creation of a COM object. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries and malware, such as the Conti ransomware, to execute commands, potentially for privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Known false positives
- network operrator may use this command.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body
name: Powershell Execute COM Object
id: 65711630-f9bf-11eb-8d72-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-08-10'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific script block text indicating the creation of a COM object. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries and malware, such as the Conti ransomware, to execute commands, potentially for privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to gain elevated privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: network operrator may use this command.
references:
- https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1423361119926816776.html
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
finding:
title: A suspicious powershell script contains COM CLSID command on host $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Ransomware
- Malicious PowerShell
- Hermetic Wiper
- Data Destruction
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059.001
- T1546.015
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*"
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `powershell_execute_com_object_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104" |
ScriptBlockText | eq |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:eq |