Detection rules › Splunk

PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.

Known false positives

  • False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection
id: 85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122
version: 19
creation_date: '2021-06-15'
modification_date: '2026-06-29'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike.
    It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed.
    This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses.
    If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104
    ScriptBlockText IN (
        "*.LoadFrom(*",
        "*.LoadModule(*",
        "*.LoadWithPartialName*",
        "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*",
        "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*",
        "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*",
        "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*",
        "*UnsafeLoadFrom*"
    )
    
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by dest signature signature_id user_id
         vendor_product EventID Guid Opcode
         Name Path ProcessID
         ScriptBlockId ScriptBlockText
    
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] containing reflective class assembly commands to load .net code in memory was executed on host $dest$
        - field: user_id
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] containing reflective class assembly commands to load .net code in memory was executed on host $dest$ by user $user_id$
analytic_story:
    - Winter Vivern
    - AgentTesla
    - AsyncRAT
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Malicious PowerShell
    - Data Destruction
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - Axios Supply Chain Post Compromise
    - VIP Keylogger
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell` EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText IN (
    "*.LoadFrom(*",
    "*.LoadModule(*",
    "*.LoadWithPartialName*",
    "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*",
    "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*",
    "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*",
    "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*",
    "*UnsafeLoadFrom*"
)

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  by dest signature signature_id user_id
     vendor_product EventID Guid Opcode
     Name Path ProcessID
     ScriptBlockId ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTextin
  • "*.LoadFrom(*"
  • "*.LoadModule(*"
  • "*.LoadWithPartialName*"
  • "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*"
  • "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*"
  • "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*"
  • "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*"
  • "*UnsafeLoadFrom*"
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:in