Detection rules › Splunk

PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via Reflection
id: 85bc3f30-ca28-11eb-bd21-acde48001122
version: 18
creation_date: '2021-06-15'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell scripts to load .NET assemblies into memory via reflection, a technique often used in malicious activities such as those by Empire and Cobalt Strike. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command executed. This behavior is significant as it can indicate advanced attack techniques aiming to execute code in memory, bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, privilege escalation, and persistent access within the environment.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104
    ScriptBlockText IN (
        "*.LoadFrom(*",
        "*.LoadModule(*",
        "*.LoadWithPartialName*",
        "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*",
        "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*",
        "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*",
        "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*",
        "*UnsafeLoadFrom*"
    )
    
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by dest signature signature_id user_id
         vendor_product EventID Guid Opcode
         Name Path ProcessID
         ScriptBlockId ScriptBlockText
    
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as day to day scripts do not use this method.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly?view=net-5.0
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user_id = "$user_id$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$$", "$user_id$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: '0'
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $ScriptBlockText$ to load .net code in memory in host $dest$
        - field: user_id
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script contains reflective class assembly command in $ScriptBlockText$ to load .net code in memory in host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Winter Vivern
    - AgentTesla
    - AsyncRAT
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Malicious PowerShell
    - Data Destruction
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - Axios Supply Chain Post Compromise
    - VIP Keylogger
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/reflection.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell` EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText IN (
    "*.LoadFrom(*",
    "*.LoadModule(*",
    "*.LoadWithPartialName*",
    "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*",
    "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*",
    "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*",
    "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*",
    "*UnsafeLoadFrom*"
)

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  by dest signature signature_id user_id
     vendor_product EventID Guid Opcode
     Name Path ProcessID
     ScriptBlockId ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `powershell_loading_dotnet_into_memory_via_reflection_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 268 (splunk 268)
ScriptBlockTextin
  • "*.LoadFrom(*"
  • "*.LoadModule(*"
  • "*.LoadWithPartialName*"
  • "*Reflection.Assembly.Load*"
  • "*Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')*"
  • "*Reflection.Assembly]::Load*"
  • "*ReflectionOnlyLoad*"
  • "*UnsafeLoadFrom*"