Detection rules › Splunk
Powershell Processing Stream Of Data
The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving compressed stream data processing, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to flag scripts using IO.Compression, IO.StreamReader, or decompression methods. This activity is significant as it often indicates obfuscated PowerShell or embedded .NET/binary execution, which are common tactics for evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body splunk
name: Powershell Processing Stream Of Data
id: 0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122
version: 17
creation_date: '2021-06-14'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving compressed stream data processing, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to flag scripts using `IO.Compression`, `IO.StreamReader`, or decompression methods. This activity is significant as it often indicates obfuscated PowerShell or embedded .NET/binary execution, which are common tactics for evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*IO.Compression.*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*IO.StreamReader*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*]::Decompress*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: powershell may used this function to process compressed data.
references:
- https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9
- https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$Computer$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search Computer = "$Computer$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$Computer$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$Computer$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $ScriptBlockText$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventID$ in host $dest$
entity:
field: user_id
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A suspicious powershell script contains stream command in $ScriptBlockText$ commonly for processing compressed or to decompressed binary file with EventCode $EventID$ in host $dest$
analytic_story:
- Hellcat Ransomware
- Malicious PowerShell
- Medusa Ransomware
- PXA Stealer
- Data Destruction
- Braodo Stealer
- AsyncRAT
- Hermetic Wiper
- IcedID
- XWorm
- MoonPeak
- MuddyWater
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.001/powershell_script_block_logging/streamreader.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = "*IO.Compression.*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*IO.StreamReader*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*]::Decompress*"
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
ScriptBlockText | eq |
|