Detection rules › Splunk

Powershell Processing Stream Of Data

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving compressed stream data processing, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to flag scripts using IO.Compression, IO.StreamReader, or decompression methods. This activity is significant as it often indicates obfuscated PowerShell or embedded .NET/binary execution, which are common tactics for evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.

Known false positives

  • powershell may used this function to process compressed data.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Powershell Processing Stream Of Data
id: 0d718b52-c9f1-11eb-bc61-acde48001122
version: 19
creation_date: '2021-06-14'
modification_date: '2026-06-29'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution involving compressed stream data processing, identified via EventCode 4104.
    It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to flag scripts using `IO.Compression`, `IO.StreamReader`, or decompression methods.
    This activity is significant as it often indicates obfuscated PowerShell or embedded .NET/binary execution, which are common tactics for evading detection.
    If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell`
    EventCode=4104
    ScriptBlockText IN (
        "*IO.Compression.*",
        "*IO.StreamReader*",
        "*]::Decompress*"
    )
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by dest signature signature_id
         user_id vendor_product EventID
         Guid Opcode Name
         Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
         ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: powershell may used this function to process compressed data.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@ahmedjouini99/deobfuscating-emotets-powershell-payload-e39fb116f7b9
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] containing stream commands to process compressed or decompressed binary file was executed on host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - Malicious PowerShell
    - Medusa Ransomware
    - PXA Stealer
    - Data Destruction
    - Braodo Stealer
    - AsyncRAT
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - IcedID
    - XWorm
    - MoonPeak
    - MuddyWater
    - Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell`
EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText IN (
    "*IO.Compression.*",
    "*IO.StreamReader*",
    "*]::Decompress*"
)

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  by dest signature signature_id
     user_id vendor_product EventID
     Guid Opcode Name
     Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
     ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `powershell_processing_stream_of_data_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTextin
  • "*IO.Compression.*"
  • "*IO.StreamReader*"
  • "*]::Decompress*"
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:in