Detection rules › Splunk

PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command Start-BitsTransfer, which can be used for file transfers, including potential data exfiltration. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because Start-BitsTransfer can be abused by adversaries to upload sensitive files to remote locations, posing a risk of data loss. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the network.

Known false positives

  • Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Execution
Persistence
Stealth

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer
id: 39e2605a-90d8-11eb-899e-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-03-30'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command `Start-BitsTransfer`, which can be used for file transfers, including potential data exfiltration. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because `Start-BitsTransfer` can be abused by adversaries to upload sensitive files to remote locations, posing a risk of data loss. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer*
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives. It is possible administrators will utilize Start-BitsTransfer for administrative tasks, otherwise filter based parent process or command-line arguments.
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/bits/using-windows-powershell-to-create-bits-transfer-jobs
finding:
    title: A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A suspicious process $process_name$ with commandline $process$ that are related to bittransfer functionality in host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - BITS Jobs
    - Gozi Malware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1197
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE `process_powershell` Processes.process=*start-bitstransfer*
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `powershell_start_bitstransfer_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "PowerShell.EXE" corpus 138 (sigma 84, splunk 30, elastic 24)
  • "powershell_ise.EXE" corpus 51 (splunk 30, sigma 18, elastic 3)
  • "pwsh.dll" corpus 112 (sigma 79, splunk 30, elastic 3)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processeq
  • "*start-bitstransfer*" corpus 5 (sigma 3, elastic 1, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "powershell.exe" corpus 184 (elastic 140, splunk 44)
  • "powershell_ise.exe" corpus 52 (splunk 29, elastic 23)
  • "pwsh.exe" corpus 77 (elastic 48, splunk 29)
field:"process_name" kind:eq