Detection rules › Splunk

Powershell Using memory As Backing Store

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution using memory streams as a backing store, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture scripts that create new objects with memory streams, often used to decompress and execute payloads in memory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential in-memory execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges without leaving a trace on the disk.

Known false positives

  • powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Powershell Using memory As Backing Store
id: c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2021-06-14'
modification_date: '2026-06-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution using memory streams as a backing store, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture scripts that create new objects with memory streams, often used to decompress and execute payloads in memory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential in-memory execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges without leaving a trace on the disk.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream*
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20201112031711/https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
finding:
    title: A PowerShell script contains memorystream command on host $dest$.
    entity:
        field: user_id
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A PowerShell script contains memorystream command on host $dest$.
analytic_story:
    - Data Destruction
    - MoonPeak
    - Medusa Ransomware
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - IcedID
    - Malicious PowerShell
    - Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream*

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest signature signature_id
       user_id vendor_product EventID
       Guid Opcode Name
       Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
       ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTexteq
  • *IO.MemoryStream* corpus 3 (splunk 2, sigma 1)
  • *New-Object* corpus 8 (sigma 7, splunk 1)
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:eq