Detection rules › Splunk
Powershell Using memory As Backing Store
The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution using memory streams as a backing store, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture scripts that create new objects with memory streams, often used to decompress and execute payloads in memory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential in-memory execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges without leaving a trace on the disk.
Known false positives
- powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104: Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body
name: Powershell Using memory As Backing Store
id: c396a0c4-c9f2-11eb-b4f5-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2021-06-14'
modification_date: '2026-06-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution using memory streams as a backing store, identified via EventCode 4104. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture scripts that create new objects with memory streams, often used to decompress and execute payloads in memory. This activity is significant as it indicates potential in-memory execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional file-based detection. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges without leaving a trace on the disk.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream*
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: powershell may used this function to store out object into memory.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20201112031711/https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/decoding-malicious-powershell-streams/
- https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
finding:
title: A PowerShell script contains memorystream command on host $dest$.
entity:
field: user_id
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A PowerShell script contains memorystream command on host $dest$.
analytic_story:
- Data Destruction
- MoonPeak
- Medusa Ransomware
- Hermetic Wiper
- IcedID
- Malicious PowerShell
- Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText = *New-Object* ScriptBlockText = *IO.MemoryStream*
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest signature signature_id
user_id vendor_product EventID
Guid Opcode Name
Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
ScriptBlockText
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `powershell_using_memory_as_backing_store_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104" |
ScriptBlockText | eq |
| field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:eq |