Detection rules › Splunk
Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder (Sysmon)
Threat actors may use tools spawning processes from the Sysnative folder in an attempt to bypass the File System Redirector on 64-bit versions of Windows to execute 32-bit applications from the 64-bit system directory. This use cased detects instances where the Sysnative folder is used during process creation, a tactic often associated with CobaltStrike activities. Note: Sysnative is often referenced by legitimate processes. Allowlisting known processes is recommended to reduce false positives.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule body
id: '23146.42111'
title: Process Creation Using Sysnative Folder
description: 'Threat actors may use tools spawning processes from the Sysnative folder
in an attempt to bypass the File System Redirector on 64-bit versions of Windows
to execute 32-bit applications from the 64-bit system directory. This use cased
detects instances where the Sysnative folder is used during process creation, a
tactic often associated with CobaltStrike activities. Note: Sysnative is often referenced
by legitimate processes. Allowlisting known processes is recommended to reduce false
positives.'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
"Sysnative" | regex process="(?i)^[A-Z]:\x5cWindows\x5cSysnative\x5c" | table _time,
host, user, parent_process_name, process | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by
_time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution
technique_id:
- T1218
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/sv-se/windows/win32/winprog64/file-system-redirector
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "Sysnative"
Stage 2: regex
| regex process="(?i)^[A-Z]:\x5cWindows\x5cSysnative\x5c"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, parent_process_name, process
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1" |
process | regex_match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>1<" |
| 1 | "Sysnative" |