Detection rules › Splunk

Process Deleting Its Process File Path

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, action, command_line, dest, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, result, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies a process attempting to delete its own file path, a behavior often associated with defense evasion techniques. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 logs, focusing on command lines executed via cmd.exe that include deletion commands. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware, such as Clop ransomware, trying to evade detection by removing its executable file if certain conditions are met. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to persist undetected, complicating incident response and remediation efforts.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Stealth

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

name: Process Deleting Its Process File Path
id: f7eda4bc-871c-11eb-b110-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-03-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a process attempting to delete its own file path, a behavior often associated with defense evasion techniques. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 logs, focusing on command lines executed via cmd.exe that include deletion commands. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware, such as Clop ransomware, trying to evade detection by removing its executable file if certain conditions are met. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to persist undetected, complicating incident response and remediation efforts.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = "* /c *" CommandLine = "* del*" Image = "*\\cmd.exe" | eval result = if(like(process,"%".parent_process."%"), "Found", "Not Found") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by action dest original_file_name parent_process parent_process_exec parent_process_guid parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path process process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_integrity_level process_name process_path user user_id vendor_product result | where result = "Found" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin11-email-campaigns-precursor-for-ransomware-data-theft
    - https://blog.virustotal.com/2020/11/keep-your-friends-close-keep-ransomware.html
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
finding:
    title: A process $process_name$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $process$ as part of defense evasion in host $dest$ by user $user$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A process $process_name$ tries to delete its process path in commandline $process$ as part of defense evasion in host $dest$ by user $user$
analytic_story:
    - Clop Ransomware
    - Data Destruction
    - WhisperGate
    - Remcos
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1070
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=1 CommandLine = "* /c *" CommandLine = "* del*" Image = "*\\cmd.exe"

Stage 2: eval

| eval result = if(like(process,"%".parent_process."%"), "Found", "Not Found")
result =
iflike(process, concat("%", parent_process, "%"))"Found"
else"Not Found"

Stage 3: stats

| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by action dest original_file_name parent_process parent_process_exec parent_process_guid parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path process process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_integrity_level process_name process_path user user_id vendor_product result

Stage 4: where

| where result = "Found"

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `process_deleting_its_process_file_path_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLineeq
  • "* /c *" corpus 6 (sigma 4, splunk 2)
  • "* del*" corpus 3 (splunk 2, sigma 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
Imageeq
  • "*\\cmd.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"Image" kind:eq
resulteq
  • "Found"
field:"result" kind:eq