Detection rules › Splunk
Process Executed from Downloads Folder - Windows (Windows Event Log)
This use case detects the execution of executable files (.exe) that originate from the Downloads folder of any user profile on a system. This technique is commonly used by threat actors who leverage social engineering or phishing campaigns to trick users into downloading and executing malicious software, which can then be used for a variety of malicious purposes such as gaining unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or delivering additional payloads.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '28729.52234'
title: Process Executed from Downloads Folder - Windows
description: This use case detects the execution of executable files (.exe) that originate
from the Downloads folder of any user profile on a system. This technique is commonly
used by threat actors who leverage social engineering or phishing campaigns to trick
users into downloading and executing malicious software, which can then be used
for a variety of malicious purposes such as gaining unauthorized access, data exfiltration,
or delivering additional payloads.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "C:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*" | regex process_path="(?i)C:\x5cUsers\x5c.+\x5cDownloads\x5c.+\.exe"
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process* | bin span=1s | stats
values(*) as * by _time, host, process_path '
techniques:
- execution:user execution
technique_id:
- T1204
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/09/25/from-screenconnect-to-hive-ransomware-in-61-hours/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "C:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*"
Stage 2: regex
| regex process_path="(?i)C:\x5cUsers\x5c.+\x5cDownloads\x5c.+\.exe"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host, process_path
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
process_path | regex_match |
| field:"process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | "C:\\Users\\*\\Downloads\\*" |