Detection rules › Splunk

Process Execution From Suspicious Folder (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and security tools. Masquerading involves altering the name or location of an object, whether legitimate or malicious, to evade defenses and avoid detection. This technique can include modifying file metadata, misleading users about the file type, and using names that resemble legitimate tasks or services. This use case detects processes executed from a suspicious folder.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Stealth

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '33791.59818'
title: Process Execution From Suspicious Folder
description: Threat actors may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to
  make them appear legitimate or benign to users and security tools. Masquerading
  involves altering the name or location of an object, whether legitimate or malicious,
  to evade defenses and avoid detection. This technique can include modifying file
  metadata, misleading users about the file type, and using names that resemble legitimate
  tasks or services. This use case detects processes executed from a suspicious folder.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ("\\$Recycle.bin\\" OR "\\config\\systemprofile\\"
  OR "\\Intel\\Logs\\" OR "\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\" OR ("\\Users\\" ("\\Public\\" OR
  "\\All Users\\" OR "\\Default\\" OR "\\NetworkService\\")) OR ("\\Windows\\" ("\\addins\\"
  OR "\\debug\\" OR "\\Fonts\\" OR "\\Help\\" OR "\\IME\\" OR "\\Media\\" OR "\\repair\\"
  OR "\\security\\" OR "\\System32\\Tasks\\" OR "\\Tasks\\")) OR "C:\\Perflogs\\")
  OR "\\Users\\Public" | regex process_path="(?i)(\x5c\$Recycle\.bin\x5c|\x5cconfig\x5csystemprofile\x5c|\x5cIntel\x5cLogs\x5c|\x5cRSA\x5cMachineKeys\x5c)|(\x5cUsers\x5c(Public|All\s+Users|Default|NetworkService)\x5c)|(\x5cWindows\x5c(addins|debug|Fonts|Help|IME|Media|repair|security|System32\x5cTasks|Tasks)\x5c)|^C:\x5cPerflogs\x5c"|
  regex parent_process_path!="(?i)(^C:\x5cUsers\x5cPublic\x5cIBM\x5cClientSolutions\x5cStart_Programs\x5c)"|
  regex parent_process_path!="(?i)(^C:\x5cWindows\x5cSysWOW64\x5cconfig\x5csystemprofile\x5cCitrix\x5cUpdaterBinaries\x5c\S+\CitrixReceiverUpdater\.exe)"
  | table _time, host, user, process, parent_*, process_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*)
  as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:masquerading
technique_id: 
- T1036
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_path.yml
- https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/07/decoding-romcom-behaviors-and-opportunities-for-detection

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ("\\$Recycle.bin\\" OR "\\config\\systemprofile\\" OR "\\Intel\\Logs\\" OR "\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\" OR ("\\Users\\" ("\\Public\\" OR "\\All Users\\" OR "\\Default\\" OR "\\NetworkService\\")) OR ("\\Windows\\" ("\\addins\\" OR "\\debug\\" OR "\\Fonts\\" OR "\\Help\\" OR "\\IME\\" OR "\\Media\\" OR "\\repair\\" OR "\\security\\" OR "\\System32\\Tasks\\" OR "\\Tasks\\")) OR "C:\\Perflogs\\") OR "\\Users\\Public"

Stage 2: regex

| regex process_path="(?i)(\x5c\$Recycle\.bin\x5c|\x5cconfig\x5csystemprofile\x5c|\x5cIntel\x5cLogs\x5c|\x5cRSA\x5cMachineKeys\x5c)|(\x5cUsers\x5c(Public|All\s+Users|Default|NetworkService)\x5c)|(\x5cWindows\x5c(addins|debug|Fonts|Help|IME|Media|repair|security|System32\x5cTasks|Tasks)\x5c)|^C:\x5cPerflogs\x5c"

Stage 3: regex

| regex parent_process_path!="(?i)(^C:\x5cUsers\x5cPublic\x5cIBM\x5cClientSolutions\x5cStart_Programs\x5c)"

Stage 4: regex

| regex parent_process_path!="(?i)(^C:\x5cWindows\x5cSysWOW64\x5cconfig\x5csystemprofile\x5cCitrix\x5cUpdaterBinaries\x5c\S+\CitrixReceiverUpdater\.exe)"

Stage 5: table

| table _time, host, user, process, parent_*, process_*

Stage 6: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 7: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
parent_process_pathregex_match"(?i)(^C:\x5cUsers\x5cPublic\x5cIBM\x5cClientSolutions\x5cStart_Programs\x5c)"excludes:parent_process_path
parent_process_pathregex_match"(?i)(^C:\x5cWindows\x5cSysWOW64\x5cconfig\x5csystemprofile\x5cCitrix\x5cUpdaterBinaries\x5c\S+\CitrixReceiverUpdater.exe)"excludes:parent_process_path

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688"
process_pathregex_match
    • "(?i)(\x5c$Recycle.bin\x5c|\x5cconfig\x5csystemprofile\x5c|\x5cIntel\x5cLogs\x5c|\x5cRSA\x5cMachineKeys\x5c)
    • (\x5cUsers\x5c(Public|All\s+Users|Default|NetworkService)\x5c)
    • (\x5cWindows\x5c(addins|debug|Fonts|Help|IME|Media|repair|security|System32\x5cTasks|Tasks)\x5c)
    • ^C:\x5cPerflogs\x5c"
    corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4688<"
1"\\$Recycle.bin\\"
1"\\config\\systemprofile\\"
1"\\Intel\\Logs\\"
1"\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\"
1"\\Users\\"
1"\\Public\\"
1"\\All Users\\"
1"\\Default\\"
1"\\NetworkService\\"
1"\\Windows\\"
1"\\addins\\"
1"\\debug\\"
1"\\Fonts\\"
1"\\Help\\"
1"\\IME\\"
1"\\Media\\"
1"\\repair\\"
1"\\security\\"
1"\\System32\\Tasks\\"
1"\\Tasks\\"
1"C:\\Perflogs\\"
1"\\Users\\Public"