Detection rules › Splunk

Proxy Execution via Appcert (PowerShell)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may exploit legitimate developer utilities to execute malicious payloads by proxy. One such utility is appcert.exe, a command-line tool included in the Windows Application Certification Kit, which is typically used to verify the compliance of Windows applications with Microsoft's certification standards. This use case detects appcert executions with commands to proxy execution of another binary

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '32821.58286'
title: Proxy Execution via Appcert
description: Threat actors may exploit legitimate developer utilities to execute malicious
  payloads by proxy. One such utility is appcert.exe, a command-line tool included
  in the Windows Application Certification Kit, which is typically used to verify
  the compliance of Windows applications with Microsoft's certification standards.
  This use case detects appcert executions with commands to proxy execution of another
  binary. Living Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS) (LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR
  "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") (TERM(appcert) OR
  "appcert.exe") TERM(test) | regex process!="(?i)\-setupcommandline"| regex process="(?i)\stest\s"|
  rex field=process "-setuppath\s+(?:\"|'')?(?<proxy_exec>[^\s\"'']+\.exe)(?:\"|'')?"
  | table _time, host, user, process, proxy_exec | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as
  * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:trusted developer utilities proxy execution
technique_id: 
- T1127
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Appcert/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") (TERM(appcert) OR "appcert.exe") TERM(test)

Stage 2: regex

| regex process!="(?i)\-setupcommandline"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process="(?i)\stest\s"

Stage 4: rex

| rex field=process "-setuppath\s+(?:\"|')?(?<proxy_exec>[^\s\"']+\.exe)(?:\"|')?"

Stage 5: table

| table _time, host, user, process, proxy_exec

Stage 6: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 7: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
processregex_match"(?i)\-setupcommandline"excludes:process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4103 corpus 105 (splunk 105)
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq
processregex_match
  • "(?i)\stest\s" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4103<"
1"<EventID>4104<"
1appcert
1"appcert.exe"
1test