Detection rules › Splunk
PTC Windchill Gateway Command Execution
This analytic detects Windchill MethodServer log4j events showing suspicious c= command execution or p= file read parameters sent to Windchill gateway paths associated with CVE-2026-4681 exploitation. PTC identifies run?c=, run?p=, .jsp?c=, and .jsp?p= request patterns as indicators to monitor during Windchill and FlexPLM exploitation response. Successful activity may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute operating system commands or read files through a weaponized gateway or JSP component.
Known false positives
- Requests to `GW/run` or randomly named `dpr_<8 hex>.jsp` files with `c=` or `p=` parameters should not be expected during normal Windchill operation. Validate whether red-team testing, vulnerability scanning, or incident response replay generated the activity before closing as benign.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Execution | |
| Collection |
Rule body
name: PTC Windchill Gateway Command Execution
id: d725b390-fe86-47df-b9a1-57497915403e
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-06-14'
modification_date: '2026-06-14'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
This analytic detects Windchill MethodServer log4j events showing suspicious `c=` command execution or `p=` file read parameters sent to Windchill gateway paths associated with CVE-2026-4681 exploitation.
PTC identifies `run?c=`, `run?p=`, `.jsp?c=`, and `.jsp?p=` request patterns as indicators to monitor during Windchill and FlexPLM exploitation response.
Successful activity may allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute operating system commands or read files through a weaponized gateway or JSP component.
data_source:
- Windchill Log4j
search: |-
`windchill_log4j`
("WindchillGW/GW/run" OR "WindchillAuthGW/GW/run" OR "/GW/run?" OR "run?c=" OR "run?p=" OR ".jsp?c=" OR ".jsp?p=" OR "dpr_")
| rex field=_raw "^(?:[^:\r\n]+:)?(?<log_ts>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2},\d{3})\s+(?<log_level>\w+)\s+\[(?<thread>[^\]]+)\]\s+(?<logger>\S+)\s+-\s+(?<payload>.*)$"
| search logger IN ("wt.servlet.ServletRequestMonitor.request", "wt.method.MethodContextMonitor.contexts.servletRequest")
| rex field=payload "^(?<event_ts>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3})\s+(?<event_tz>[+\-]\d{4}),\s+(?<rest>.*)$"
| eval parts=split(rest,", ")
| eval event_type=case(logger="wt.servlet.ServletRequestMonitor.request","servlet_request",logger="wt.method.MethodContextMonitor.contexts.servletRequest","method_context_servlet_request",true(),"other")
| eval src_ip=case(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,2),event_type="method_context_servlet_request",mvindex(parts,5))
| eval uri_path=case(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,3),event_type="method_context_servlet_request",mvindex(parts,8))
| eval query_string=if(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,4),null())
| eval http_method=if(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,5),null())
| eval status=if(event_type="servlet_request",tonumber(mvindex(parts,6)),null())
| rex field=uri_path "^(?<uri_only>[^\?]+)(?:\?(?<uri_query>.*))?$"
| eval query_string=if(query_string="-",null(),query_string)
| eval query_string=coalesce(query_string,uri_query)
| rex field=query_string "(?i)(?:^|&)(?<query_param>[cp])=(?<query_value>[^&]*)"
| eval query_param=lower(query_param), query_value=urldecode(replace(query_value,"\+","%20"))
| where isnotnull(uri_only) AND isnotnull(query_param)
| where (match(uri_only,"(?i)(^|/)GW/run$") OR match(uri_only,"(?i)/servlet/(WindchillGW|WindchillAuthGW)/GW/run$") OR match(uri_only,"(?i)(^|/)dpr_[0-9a-f]{8}\.jsp$")) AND (query_param="c" OR query_param="p")
| where NOT (query_param="c" AND match(query_value,"(?i)^echo(\s|20)+GW_READY_OK$"))
| eval activity=case(query_param="c","command_execution_parameter",query_param="p","file_read_parameter",true(),"unknown")
| eval src=src_ip
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
values(log_level) as log_level
values(logger) as logger
values(http_method) as http_method
values(status) as status
values(uri_only) as uri_path
values(query_string) as query_string
by src activity query_param query_value
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `ptc_windchill_gateway_command_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To implement this analytic, ingest PTC Windchill MethodServer log4j logs into Splunk with sourcetype `log4j`.
Update the `windchill_log4j` macro to include the appropriate index constraints for your environment.
The analytic expects log entries from the `wt.servlet.ServletRequestMonitor.request` and `wt.method.MethodContextMonitor.contexts.servletRequest` loggers and parses embedded servlet URI, query parameter, source IP, HTTP method, and status fields.
known_false_positives: |
Requests to `GW/run` or randomly named `dpr_<8 hex>.jsp` files with `c=` or `p=` parameters should not be expected during normal Windchill operation.
Validate whether red-team testing, vulnerability scanning, or incident response replay generated the activity before closing as benign.
references:
- https://www.ptc.com/en/about/trust-center/advisory-center/active-advisories/windchill-flexplm-critical-vulnerability
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4681
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-085-03
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: src
type: system
score: 20
message: Potential PTC Windchill gateway command or file read activity detected from $src$.
threat_objects:
- field: src
type: ip_address
analytic_story:
- PTC Windchill Exploitation
asset_type: Web Application
cve:
- CVE-2026-4681
mitre_attack_id:
- T1190
- T1059
- T1005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: application
security_domain: network
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`windchill_log4j`
("WindchillGW/GW/run" OR "WindchillAuthGW/GW/run" OR "/GW/run?" OR "run?c=" OR "run?p=" OR ".jsp?c=" OR ".jsp?p=" OR "dpr_")
Stage 2: rex
| rex field=_raw "^(?:[^:\r\n]+:)?(?<log_ts>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2},\d{3})\s+(?<log_level>\w+)\s+\[(?<thread>[^\]]+)\]\s+(?<logger>\S+)\s+-\s+(?<payload>.*)$"
Stage 3: search
| search logger IN ("wt.servlet.ServletRequestMonitor.request", "wt.method.MethodContextMonitor.contexts.servletRequest")
Stage 4: rex
| rex field=payload "^(?<event_ts>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3})\s+(?<event_tz>[+\-]\d{4}),\s+(?<rest>.*)$"
Stage 5: eval
| eval parts=split(rest,", ")
Stage 6: eval
| eval event_type=case(logger="wt.servlet.ServletRequestMonitor.request","servlet_request",logger="wt.method.MethodContextMonitor.contexts.servletRequest","method_context_servlet_request",true(),"other")
event_type =if
logger = "wt.servlet.ServletRequestMonitor.request""servlet_request"elif
logger = "wt.method.MethodContextMonitor.contexts.servletRequest""method_context_servlet_request"else
"other"Stage 7: eval
| eval src_ip=case(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,2),event_type="method_context_servlet_request",mvindex(parts,5))
src_ip =if
event_type = "servlet_request"mvindex(parts, 2)else
mvindex(parts, 5)Stage 8: eval
| eval uri_path=case(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,3),event_type="method_context_servlet_request",mvindex(parts,8))
uri_path =if
event_type = "servlet_request"mvindex(parts, 3)else
mvindex(parts, 8)Stage 9: eval
| eval query_string=if(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,4),null())
Stage 10: eval
| eval http_method=if(event_type="servlet_request",mvindex(parts,5),null())
Stage 11: eval
| eval status=if(event_type="servlet_request",tonumber(mvindex(parts,6)),null())
Stage 12: rex
| rex field=uri_path "^(?<uri_only>[^\?]+)(?:\?(?<uri_query>.*))?$"
Stage 13: eval
| eval query_string=if(query_string="-",null(),query_string)
Stage 14: eval
| eval query_string=coalesce(query_string,uri_query)
Stage 15: rex
| rex field=query_string "(?i)(?:^|&)(?<query_param>[cp])=(?<query_value>[^&]*)"
Stage 16: eval
| eval query_param=lower(query_param), query_value=urldecode(replace(query_value,"\+","%20"))
Stage 17: where
| where isnotnull(uri_only) AND isnotnull(query_param)
Stage 18: where
| where (match(uri_only,"(?i)(^|/)GW/run$") OR match(uri_only,"(?i)/servlet/(WindchillGW|WindchillAuthGW)/GW/run$") OR match(uri_only,"(?i)(^|/)dpr_[0-9a-f]{8}\.jsp$")) AND (query_param="c" OR query_param="p")
Stage 19: where
| where NOT (query_param="c" AND match(query_value,"(?i)^echo(\s|20)+GW_READY_OK$"))
Stage 20: eval
| eval activity=case(query_param="c","command_execution_parameter",query_param="p","file_read_parameter",true(),"unknown")
activity =if
query_param = "c""command_execution_parameter"elif
query_param = "p""file_read_parameter"else
"unknown"Stage 21: eval
| eval src=src_ip
Stage 22: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
values(log_level) as log_level
values(logger) as logger
values(http_method) as http_method
values(status) as status
values(uri_only) as uri_path
values(query_string) as query_string
by src activity query_param query_value
Stage 23: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 24: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 25: search
| `ptc_windchill_gateway_command_execution_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
query_param | eq | "c" | excludes:query_param |
query_value | regex_match | "(?i)^echo(\s|20)+GW_READY_OK$" | excludes:query_value |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
logger | in |
| field:"logger" kind:in |
query_param | eq |
| field:"query_param" kind:eq |
query_param | is_not_null | field:"query_param" kind:is_not_null | |
sourcetype | eq |
| field:"sourcetype" kind:eq value:"log4j" |
uri_only | is_not_null | field:"uri_only" kind:is_not_null | |
uri_only | regex_match |
| field:"uri_only" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "WindchillGW/GW/run" |
| 1 | "WindchillAuthGW/GW/run" |
| 1 | "/GW/run?" |
| 1 | "run?c=" |
| 1 | "run?p=" |
| 1 | ".jsp?c=" |
| 1 | ".jsp?p=" |
| 1 | "dpr_" |