Detection rules › Splunk
Rclone Execution (PowerShell)
Rclone is a command line program to manage files on cloud storage. It is a feature rich alternative to cloud vendors' web storage interfaces. Adversaries have been known to use rclone in order to exfiltrate data
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4103 | Payload Context: ContextInfo User Data: UserData. |
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body yaml
id: '6357.18233'
title: Rclone Execution
description: 'Rclone is a command line program to manage files on cloud storage. It
is a feature rich alternative to cloud vendors'' web storage interfaces. Adversaries
have been known to use rclone in order to exfiltrate data. -- Threat Actor Association:
ALPHV/BlackCat, BlackMatter, DarkSide, Daixin Team, FIN7, FIN8 (Syssphinx), Hello
Kitty / Five Hands, Karakurt, LockBit, Scattered Spider (aka. 0ktapus, UNC3944),
Turla (akaSecret Blizzard, KRYPTON, and UAC-0003), UNC2628, Wizard Spider - Software
Association: Akira, AvosLocker, BazarLoader, BianLian, Blackbyte, Blackcat/ALPHV,
Black Basta, Conti, Lockbit, Ransom Cartel, Royal, Vice Society'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: ' `get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4104)
OR "<EventID>4104<" OR TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<") ("rclone.exe" OR
"rclone32.exe" OR "rclone") | table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id,
parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host | where match(process,
"(?i)rclone") `hec_collect`'
techniques:
- exfiltration:exfiltration over web service:exfiltration to cloud storage
- exfiltration:data transfer size limits
- exfiltration:exfiltration over alternative protocol:exfiltration over unencrypted
non-c2 protocol
technique_id:
- T1567.002
- T1030
- T1048.003
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
references:
- https://rclone.org/
- https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/darkside-ransomware-victims-sold-short/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/royal-ransomware/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<" OR TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<") ("rclone.exe" OR "rclone32.exe" OR "rclone")
Stage 2: table
| table _time, host, user process, process_*, signature_id, parent_*
Stage 3: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 4: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Stage 5: where
| where match(process, "(?i)rclone") `hec_collect`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4104<" |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4103<" |
| 1 | "rclone.exe" |
| 1 | "rclone32.exe" |
| 1 | "rclone" |