Detection rules › Splunk
RDP File Executed from Outlook Temp Directory (Windows Event Log)
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Targeted spear-phishing campaigns attributed to Russia’s APT29 have been observed distributing .rdp files to victims to initiate a remote connection. This use case detects the execution of .rdp files in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Lateral Movement |
References
- https://x.com/cyb3rops/status/1851880158640099675?s=46
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/6281076
- https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/amazon-identified-internet-domains-abused-by-apt29/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/5063/files
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '39090.70294'
title: RDP File Executed from Outlook Temp Directory
description: Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a
user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface
on a remote system. Targeted spear-phishing campaigns attributed to Russia’s APT29
have been observed distributing .rdp files to victims to initiate a remote connection.
This use case detects the execution of .rdp files in the temporary directory that
Outlook uses when opening attachments.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ".rdp" ("\\AppData\\Local\\Packages\\Microsoft.Outlook_"
OR ("\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" "\\Content.Outlook\\"))| where match(process,
"(?i)((\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cMicrosoft\x5cWindows\x5c.*\x5cContent\.Outlook\x5c)|(\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cPackages\x5cMicrosoft\.Outlook_)).*\.rdp")
| table _time, host, user, process_*, process, parent_*, file_* | bin span=1s |
stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- lateral-movement:remote services:remote desktop protocol
- initial-access:phishing:spearphishing attachment
technique_id:
- T1021.001
- T1566.001
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://x.com/cyb3rops/status/1851880158640099675?s=46
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/6281076
- https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/amazon-identified-internet-domains-abused-by-apt29/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/5063/files
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ".rdp" ("\\AppData\\Local\\Packages\\Microsoft.Outlook_" OR ("\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" "\\Content.Outlook\\"))
Stage 2: where
| where match(process, "(?i)((\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cMicrosoft\x5cWindows\x5c.*\x5cContent\.Outlook\x5c)|(\x5cAppData\x5cLocal\x5cPackages\x5cMicrosoft\.Outlook_)).*\.rdp")
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, process_*, process, parent_*, file_*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
process | regex_match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | ".rdp" |
| 1 | "\\AppData\\Local\\Packages\\Microsoft.Outlook_" |
| 1 | "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" |
| 1 | "\\Content.Outlook\\" |