Detection rules › Splunk

Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
TargetObject, computer_name, details, event_type, process_guid, process_id, registry_hive, registry_path, registry_status, registry_value_name, registry_value_type, user, vendor_product
Author
David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects modifications to registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" that can be used for privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths and values like GlobalFlag and Debugger. This activity is significant because attackers can use these modifications to intercept executable calls and attach malicious binaries to legitimate system binaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.

Known false positives

  • There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation
id: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5bcbc5e
version: 17
creation_date: '2020-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: David Dorsey, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects modifications to registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" that can be used for privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths and values like GlobalFlag and Debugger. This activity is significant because attackers can use these modifications to intercept executable calls and attach malicious binaries to legitimate system binaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger)) by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | where isnotnull(registry_value_data) | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.
references:
    - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/12/an-introduction-to-image-file-execution-options/
finding:
    title: A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Windows Privilege Escalation
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - Data Destruction
    - Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1546.012
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger)) by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`

Stage 3: where

| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Registry.registry_patheq
  • "*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"registry_path" kind:eq
Registry.registry_value_nameeq
  • Debugger corpus 3 (splunk 2, elastic 1)
  • GlobalFlag
field:"registry_value_name" kind:eq
registry_value_datais_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"Details" kind:is_not_null