Detection rules › Splunk

regsvr32 Execution (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Using regsvr32.exe, an adversary may load malicious .dll files

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '5977.18111'
title: regsvr32 Execution
description: 'Using regsvr32.exe, an adversary may load malicious .dll files. -- Living
  Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS) (LOLBIN) -- Threat Actor Association: Kimsuky,
  TA551, Traveling Spider, Wizard Spider -- Software Association: Astaroth, Bazar,
  Black Basta, Conti, HermeticWizard, IcedID, Nefilim, Qakbot/Qbot, Rhysida, XingLocker,
  Zloader Atomics T1218.010 Test#1 Atomics T1218.010 Test#2 Atomics T1218.010 Test#3
  Atomics T1218.010 Test#4 Atomics T1218.010 Test#5'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  TERM(regsvr32) | regex process="(?i)(regsvr32)"| table _time, host, user parent_*,
  process, process_*, signature_id | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time,
  host | eventstats dc(process) as dc_process by host | where dc_process < 10 '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:regsvr32
technique_id:
- T1218.010
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
- https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") TERM(regsvr32)

Stage 2: regex

| regex process="(?i)(regsvr32)"

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Stage 6: eventstats

| eventstats dc(process) as dc_process by host

Stage 7: where

| where dc_process < 10

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
dc_processlt
  • 10 corpus 4 (splunk 4)
field:"dc_process" kind:lt value:"10"
processregex_match
  • "(?i)(regsvr32)" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1regsvr32