Detection rules › Splunk

Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the loading of a DLL using the regsvr32 application with the silent parameter and DLLInstall execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and parent process details. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by RAT malware like Remcos and njRAT to load malicious DLLs on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.

Known false positives

  • Other third part application may used this parameter. One identified use case is Microsoft Teams. Apply the necessary filters before using this rule in production.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Regsvr32 Silent and Install Param Dll Loading
id: f421c250-24e7-11ec-bc43-acde48001122
version: 15
creation_date: '2021-10-04'
modification_date: '2026-06-09'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the loading of a DLL using the regsvr32 application with the silent parameter and DLLInstall execution. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line arguments and parent process details. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by RAT malware like Remcos and njRAT to load malicious DLLs on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    `process_regsvr32`
    Processes.process  IN ("*/i*", "*-i*")
    Processes.process  IN ("*/s*", "*-s*")
    NOT Processes.process="*Microsoft\\TeamsMeetingAddin*"
    
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
        Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
        Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
        Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
        Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
        Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
        Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Other third part application may used this parameter.
    One identified use case is Microsoft Teams. Apply the necessary filters before using this rule in production.
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/dc93ee63-050c-4ff8-b07e-8277af9ab939/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to load a DLL using the silent and dllinstall parameter.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - AsyncRAT
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Living Off The Land
    - Data Destruction
    - Remcos
    - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.010
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

`process_regsvr32`
Processes.process  IN ("*/i*", "*-i*")
Processes.process  IN ("*/s*", "*-s*")
NOT Processes.process="*Microsoft\\TeamsMeetingAddin*"

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
    Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
    Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
    Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
    Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
    Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
    Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `regsvr32_silent_and_install_param_dll_loading_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Processes.processeq"*Microsoft\\TeamsMeetingAddin*"excludes:Processes.process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "REGSVR32.EXE" corpus 37 (sigma 17, elastic 15, splunk 5)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*-i*" corpus 7 (sigma 7)
  • "*-s*" corpus 10 (sigma 4, kusto 4, elastic 1, splunk 1)
  • "*/i*" corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • "*/s*" corpus 8 (sigma 6, splunk 2)
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "regsvr32.exe" corpus 73 (elastic 68, splunk 5)
field:"process_name" kind:eq