Detection rules › Splunk
Rubeus Commands (Sysmon)
Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
Rule body yaml
id: '5473.17082'
title: Rubeus Commands
description: 'Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. -- Threat
Actor Association: Wizard Spider - Software Association: Conti, Diavol, Quakbot/Qbot
-- Atomics T1558.003 Test#2'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` TERM(exe) ("EventCode=1" OR
"<EventID>1<") (TERM(harvest) OR TERM(ptt) OR TERM(s4u) OR TERM(asktgt) OR TERM(brute)
OR TERM(createnetonly) OR TERM(changepw) OR TERM(hash) OR TERM(tgssub) OR TERM(asktgs)
OR TERM(renew) OR TERM(describe) OR TERM(monitor) OR TERM(purge) OR TERM(klist)
OR TERM(triage) OR TERM(dump) OR TERM(tgtdeleg) OR TERM(kerberoast) OR TERM(asreproast)
OR TERM(currentluid)) |regex process="(?i)\.exe\"?\s+(((harvest|ptt|s4u|asktgt|brute|createnetonly|changepw|hash|tgssub|asktgs|renew|describe|monitor)(\s+)?\/\w+\:)|((purge|klist|triage|dump|tgtdeleg|kerberoast|asreproast|currentluid)((\s+)?\/\w+)?))"
| table _time, host, user, signature_id, process, process_id, process_name, parent_process_name
| bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets:golden ticket
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets:silver ticket
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets:kerberoasting
technique_id:
- T1558
- T1558.003
- T1558.002
- T1558.001
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` TERM(exe) ("EventCode=1" OR "<EventID>1<") (TERM(harvest) OR TERM(ptt) OR TERM(s4u) OR TERM(asktgt) OR TERM(brute) OR TERM(createnetonly) OR TERM(changepw) OR TERM(hash) OR TERM(tgssub) OR TERM(asktgs) OR TERM(renew) OR TERM(describe) OR TERM(monitor) OR TERM(purge) OR TERM(klist) OR TERM(triage) OR TERM(dump) OR TERM(tgtdeleg) OR TERM(kerberoast) OR TERM(asreproast) OR TERM(currentluid))
Stage 2: regex
| regex process="(?i)\.exe\"?\s+(((harvest|ptt|s4u|asktgt|brute|createnetonly|changepw|hash|tgssub|asktgs|renew|describe|monitor)(\s+)?\/\w+\:)|((purge|klist|triage|dump|tgtdeleg|kerberoast|asreproast|currentluid)((\s+)?\/\w+)?))"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, signature_id, process, process_id, process_name, parent_process_name
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
process | regex_match |
|
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | exe |
| 1 | "EventCode=1" |
| 1 | "<EventID>1<" |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | harvest |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | ptt |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | s4u |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | asktgt |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | brute |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | createnetonly |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | changepw |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | hash |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | tgssub |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | asktgs |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | renew |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | describe |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | monitor |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | purge |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | klist |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | triage |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | dump |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | tgtdeleg |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | kerberoast |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | asreproast |
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | currentluid |