Detection rules › Splunk
Rubeus Commands (Windows Event Log)
Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '5473.5639'
title: Rubeus Commands
description: 'Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses. -- Threat
Actor Association: Wizard Spider - Software Association: Conti, Diavol, Quakbot/Qbot
-- Atomics T1558.003 Test#2'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` TERM(exe) (TERM(EventCode=4688)
OR "<EventID>4688<") (TERM(harvest) OR TERM(ptt) OR TERM(s4u) OR TERM(asktgt) OR
TERM(brute) OR TERM(createnetonly) OR TERM(changepw) OR TERM(hash) OR TERM(tgssub)
OR TERM(asktgs) OR TERM(renew) OR TERM(describe) OR TERM(monitor) OR TERM(purge)
OR TERM(klist) OR TERM(triage) OR TERM(dump) OR TERM(tgtdeleg) OR TERM(kerberoast)
OR TERM(asreproast) OR TERM(currentluid)) |regex process="(?i)\.exe\"?\s+(((harvest|ptt|s4u|asktgt|brute|createnetonly|changepw|hash|tgssub|asktgs|renew|describe|monitor)(\s+)?\/\w+\:)|((purge|klist|triage|dump|tgtdeleg|kerberoast|asreproast|currentluid)((\s+)?\/\w+)?))"
| table _time, host, user, signature_id, process, process_id, process_name, parent_process_name
| bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets:golden ticket
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets:silver ticket
- credential-access:steal or forge kerberos tickets:kerberoasting
technique_id:
- T1558
- T1558.003
- T1558.002
- T1558.001
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` TERM(exe) (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<") (TERM(harvest) OR TERM(ptt) OR TERM(s4u) OR TERM(asktgt) OR TERM(brute) OR TERM(createnetonly) OR TERM(changepw) OR TERM(hash) OR TERM(tgssub) OR TERM(asktgs) OR TERM(renew) OR TERM(describe) OR TERM(monitor) OR TERM(purge) OR TERM(klist) OR TERM(triage) OR TERM(dump) OR TERM(tgtdeleg) OR TERM(kerberoast) OR TERM(asreproast) OR TERM(currentluid))
Stage 2: regex
| regex process="(?i)\.exe\"?\s+(((harvest|ptt|s4u|asktgt|brute|createnetonly|changepw|hash|tgssub|asktgs|renew|describe|monitor)(\s+)?\/\w+\:)|((purge|klist|triage|dump|tgtdeleg|kerberoast|asreproast|currentluid)((\s+)?\/\w+)?))"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user, signature_id, process, process_id, process_name, parent_process_name
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
process | regex_match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | exe |
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | harvest |
| 1 | ptt |
| 1 | s4u |
| 1 | asktgt |
| 1 | brute |
| 1 | createnetonly |
| 1 | changepw |
| 1 | hash |
| 1 | tgssub |
| 1 | asktgs |
| 1 | renew |
| 1 | describe |
| 1 | monitor |
| 1 | purge |
| 1 | klist |
| 1 | triage |
| 1 | dump |
| 1 | tgtdeleg |
| 1 | kerberoast |
| 1 | asreproast |
| 1 | currentluid |