Detection rules › Splunk
Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access
The following analytic detects a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process, indicative of the Rubeus tool attempting to export Kerberos tickets from memory. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on processes obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant as it often precedes pass-the-ticket attacks, where adversaries use stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass normal access controls, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Lateral Movement | T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 10 | ProcessAccess |
Rule body splunk
name: Rubeus Kerberos Ticket Exports Through Winlogon Access
id: 5ed8c50a-8869-11ec-876f-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-02-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a process accessing the winlogon.exe system process, indicative of the Rubeus tool attempting to export Kerberos tickets from memory. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on processes obtaining a handle to winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant as it often precedes pass-the-ticket attacks, where adversaries use stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass normal access controls, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 10
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\Windows\\system32\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by CallTrace EventID GrantedAccess Guid Opcode ProcessID SecurityID SourceImage SourceProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessGUID TargetProcessId UserID dest granted_access parent_process_exec parent_process_guid parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path process_exec process_guid process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`'
how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs and a sysmon configuration, which includes EventCode 10. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`. We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations (index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk environment.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may obtain a handle for winlogon.exe. Filter as needed
references:
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210725005734/http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Winlogon.exe was accessed by $SourceImage$ on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: TargetImage
type: process
analytic_story:
- CISA AA23-347A
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
- BlackSuit Ransomware
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
- ZOVWiper
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1550.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550.003/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=C:\\Windows\\system32\\winlogon.exe (GrantedAccess=0x1f3fff) (SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\LogonUI.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\smss.exe AND SourceImage!=C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe)
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by CallTrace EventID GrantedAccess Guid Opcode ProcessID SecurityID SourceImage SourceProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessGUID TargetProcessId UserID dest granted_access parent_process_exec parent_process_guid parent_process_id parent_process_name parent_process_path process_exec process_guid process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `rubeus_kerberos_ticket_exports_through_winlogon_access_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
GrantedAccess | eq |
|
SourceImage | ne |
|
TargetImage | eq |
|