Detection rules › Splunk

Rundll32.exe as Parent Process (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

id: '5850.6131'
title: Rundll32.exe as Parent Process
description: 'Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code.
  Using rundll32.exe, may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution
  of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal
  operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads. Threat
  Actor Association: MuddyWater, TA505, Wizard Spider - Software Association: Bazar,
  Clop, Conti, Quantum, Rhysida, Trickbot'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<") TERM(rundll32) | regex parent_process_name="(?i)(rundll32)" |
  table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id | bin span=1s
  | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:rundll32
technique_id:
- T1218.011
data_category:
- Process command-line parameters
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/rundll32/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<") TERM(rundll32)

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_name="(?i)(rundll32)"

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user parent_*, process, process_*, signature_id

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 313 (splunk 283, kusto 30)
parent_process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)(rundll32)" corpus 2 (splunk 2)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1TERM
1"<EventID>4688<"
1TERM
1rundll32