Detection rules › Splunk

rundll32.exe Executing DLL from Non-standard Directory (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

rundll32.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used to run functions stored in Dynamic Link Libraries. Because rundll32 is a trusted system utility with the ability to execute code, it is a high value target for abuse by threat actors. Threat actors leveraging Qbot malware have been observed dropping DLLs into writeable paths and calling them with rundll32.exe. This use case detects when a DLL in a nonstandard directory is called by rundll32

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '27238.49667'
title: rundll32.exe Executing DLL from Non-standard Directory
description: rundll32.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used to run functions stored
  in Dynamic Link Libraries. Because rundll32 is a trusted system utility with the
  ability to execute code, it is a high value target for abuse by threat actors. Threat
  actors leveraging Qbot malware have been observed dropping DLLs into writeable paths
  and calling them with rundll32.exe. This use case detects when a DLL in a nonstandard
  directory is called by rundll32. Living Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS)
  (LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  "rundll32" ".dll" | regex process_name="(?i)rundll32\.exe"| regex process!="(?i)(rundll32(\.exe)?\"?\s+(\/\w+\s+)?[\w.]+\.dll)|(C:\x5c(Windows\x5c(System32|WinSxS|SysWoW64)|Program\sFiles(\s\(x86\))?\x5c.+\.dll))"|
  table _time, host, user, process_*, process, parent_process_* | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:rundll32
technique_id:
- T1218.011
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/lolbins-abuse/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "rundll32" ".dll"

Stage 2: regex

| regex process_name="(?i)rundll32\.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process!="(?i)(rundll32(\.exe)?\"?\s+(\/\w+\s+)?[\w.]+\.dll)|(C:\x5c(Windows\x5c(System32|WinSxS|SysWoW64)|Program\sFiles(\s\(x86\))?\x5c.+\.dll))"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process_*, process, parent_process_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
processregex_match"(?i)(rundll32(.exe)?\"?\s+(\/\w+\s+)?[\w.]+.dll), (C:\x5c(Windows\x5c(System32|WinSxS|SysWoW64)|Program\sFiles(\s(x86))?\x5c.+.dll))"excludes:process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)rundll32.exe" corpus 6 (splunk 6)
field:"process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1"rundll32"
1".dll"