Detection rules › Splunk
Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files
The following analytic detects a rundll32 process creating executable (.exe) or dynamic link library (.dll) files. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify instances where rundll32.exe generates these file types. This activity is significant because rundll32 is often exploited by malware, such as IcedID, to drop malicious payloads in directories like Temp, AppData, or ProgramData. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 11 | FileCreate |
Rule body splunk
name: Rundll32 Process Creating Exe Dll Files
id: 6338266a-ee2a-11eb-bf68-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2021-08-03'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a rundll32 process creating executable (.exe) or dynamic link library (.dll) files. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to identify instances where rundll32.exe generates these file types. This activity is significant because rundll32 is often exploited by malware, such as IcedID, to drop malicious payloads in directories like Temp, AppData, or ProgramData. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, establish persistence, or escalate privileges within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 11
search: |-
`sysmon` EventCode=11 Image="*rundll32.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.dll")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY action dest file_name
file_path process_guid process_id
user_id vendor_product
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, TargetFilename, and eventcode 11 executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://any.run/malware-trends/icedid
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: rundll32 process drops a file $file_name$ on host $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: file_name
type: file_name
analytic_story:
- IcedID
- Living Off The Land
- Gh0st RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.011
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/icedid/inf_icedid/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=11 Image="*rundll32.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.dll")
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY action dest file_name
file_path process_guid process_id
user_id vendor_product
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `rundll32_process_creating_exe_dll_files_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
Image | eq |
|
TargetFilename | in |
|