Detection rules › Splunk

rundll32 Suspicious Parent Process (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Expected legitimate parent processes for rundll32 include svchost, explorer, spoolsv, and rundll32 itself. This use case detects executions of rundll32 with parent process names that are commonly targeted by threat actors for abuse

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '27464.49949'
title: rundll32 Suspicious Parent Process
description: Expected legitimate parent processes for rundll32 include svchost, explorer,
  spoolsv, and rundll32 itself. This use case detects executions of rundll32 with
  parent process names that are commonly targeted by threat actors for abuse. Living
  Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS) (LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  "rundll32.exe" OR TERM(rundll32) | regex parent_process_name="(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|onenote|msaccess|lsass|taskeng|winlogon|schtask|regsvr32|wmiprvse|wsmprovhost|chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|iexplore|outlook|thunderbird|powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript)\.exe"|
  where not (match(parent_process_name, "(?i)iexplore\.exe") and match(process, "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cinetcpl\.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess"))|
  table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:rundll32
technique_id:
- T1218.011
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/lolbins-abuse/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "rundll32.exe" OR TERM(rundll32)

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_name="(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|onenote|msaccess|lsass|taskeng|winlogon|schtask|regsvr32|wmiprvse|wsmprovhost|chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|iexplore|outlook|thunderbird|powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript)\.exe"

Stage 3: where

| where not (match(parent_process_name, "(?i)iexplore\.exe") and match(process, "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cinetcpl\.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess"))

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
parent_process_nameregex_match"(?i)iexplore.exe"excludes:parent_process_name
processregex_match"(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cinetcpl.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess"excludes:process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
parent_process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|onenote|msaccess|lsass|taskeng|winlogon|schtask|regsvr32|wmiprvse|wsmprovhost|chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|iexplore|outlook|thunderbird|powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript).exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1"rundll32.exe"
1rundll32