Detection rules › Splunk
rundll32 Suspicious Parent Process (Windows Event Log)
Expected legitimate parent processes for rundll32 include svchost, explorer, spoolsv, and rundll32 itself. This use case detects executions of rundll32 with parent process names that are commonly targeted by threat actors for abuse
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '27464.49948'
title: rundll32 Suspicious Parent Process
description: Expected legitimate parent processes for rundll32 include svchost, explorer,
spoolsv, and rundll32 itself. This use case detects executions of rundll32 with
parent process names that are commonly targeted by threat actors for abuse. Living
Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS) (LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "rundll32.exe" OR TERM(rundll32) | regex parent_process_name="(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|onenote|msaccess|lsass|taskeng|winlogon|schtask|regsvr32|wmiprvse|wsmprovhost|chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|iexplore|outlook|thunderbird|powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript)\.exe"|
where not (match(parent_process_name, "(?i)iexplore\.exe") and match(process, "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cinetcpl\.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess"))|
table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s | stats
values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:rundll32
technique_id:
- T1218.011
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/lolbins-abuse/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "rundll32.exe" OR TERM(rundll32)
Stage 2: regex
| regex parent_process_name="(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|onenote|msaccess|lsass|taskeng|winlogon|schtask|regsvr32|wmiprvse|wsmprovhost|chrome|firefox|msedge|opera|iexplore|outlook|thunderbird|powershell|pwsh|cmd|wscript|cscript)\.exe"
Stage 3: where
| where not (match(parent_process_name, "(?i)iexplore\.exe") and match(process, "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cinetcpl\.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess"))
Stage 4: table
| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_*
Stage 5: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 6: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
parent_process_name | regex_match | "(?i)iexplore.exe" | excludes:parent_process_name |
process | regex_match | "(?i)C:\x5cWindows\x5csystem32\x5cinetcpl.cpl,ClearMyTracksByProcess" | excludes:process |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
parent_process_name | regex_match |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | "rundll32.exe" |
| 1 | rundll32 |